Supreme Court Weekly Digest

[September 10 – 14, 2025]

Indian Civil Code, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 482  – Anticipatory bail – Classification of courts – The concurrent jurisdiction of the Sessions Court and the High Court for anticipatory bail under Section 482 of the BNSS does not mean that a person can bypass the Sessions Court and approach the High Court directly – The classification of courts demands that a person seeking pre-arrest bail should not be permitted or encouraged to bypass the jurisdiction of the concerned Sessions Court – Encouraging the practice of going directly to the High Court for anticipatory bail would result in a large number of applications being filed in the High Court, which would create a ‘chaotic situation’ – A significant number of applications are likely to be granted at the Sessions Court stage before the case reaches the High Court – In most States, there is a consistent practice where litigants first have to approach the Sessions Court for anticipatory bail and only if they are not exempted can they approach the High Court.  [Para 6-9] Mohammad Rasal C. v. State of Kerala,  2025 Livell (SC) 884

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 151  – Inherent power – Delay of 3966 days in filing of second appeal – High Court wrongly condoned huge delay of 3966 days on the ground of administrative error and lack of follow-up by State officers – Such reason does not constitute ‘sufficient reason’ under Section 5 of the Limitation Act – Condoning such delay would defeat the fundamental objectives of the Limitation Act, which is to ensure finality of the case and to prevent a litigant from being kept in a state of uncertainty – Delay by State bodies on account of administrative laxity should not be condoned – Supreme Court cautioned High Courts that excessive delay by State bodies on account of administrative laxity and laxity should not be condoned – Appeal allowed.  [Paras 116, 171, 255, 260-263] Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board,  2025 LiveLaw (SC) 899  : 2025 INSC 1104

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 154  – FIR – Detention, Police officers, as ‘guardians’ of the law, must be alert, prompt and objective in the discharge of their duties, renouncing any personal bias – Failure of the police to register an FIR despite being informed of the cognizable offence was a complete ‘negligence of duty’ – Under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the police are bound to register a cognizable offence after receiving information – The Supreme Court criticised the Superintendent of Police for not taking action on the written complaint sent by the appellant’s father under Section 154(3) – It is regrettable that the higher officials did not file an affidavit in the High Court in this regard, leaving the matter to the local police inspector – The Home Ministry was directed to constitute an SIT to investigate the appellant’s complaint, register an FIR for the assault and take appropriate action – Appeal allowed.  [Para 16, 18-24] Mohammad Afzal Mohammad Sharif v. State of Maharashtra,  2025 Live Law (SC) 894  : 2025 INSC 1100

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 154  – Registration of FIR – Duty of police to register FIR if prima facie evidence of cognizable offence is established – No need for police to verify the truth and credibility of the information – Extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not wholly barred by the availability of alternative remedies – When the allegations relate to misuse of public office and corruption of public servants, such actions fall within the category of cognizable offences which require investigation – In such cases, preliminary investigation is not required before registration of FIR – Preliminary investigation report is not a final report on which to base a conclusion that a cognizable offence has been committed Abrogation of power of Constitutional Court to decide – It is high time that investigators should also conduct investigations so that public confidence in the system is maintained.  [Para 26 – 32] Vinod Kumar Pandey v. Seesh Ram Saini,  2025 LiveLaw (SC) 887  : 2025 INSC 1095

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 197  – The issue of permission to file a case under Section 197 can be raised in the trial court at any stage of the trial – Determination depends on the nature of the evidence presented by the prosecution at the time of trial – The applicant is allowed to apply to the trial court for exemption from personal appearance under Sections 228 and 355 of the CrPC. [Paragraphs 7 – 9] Ram Sagar v. Central Bureau of Investigation,  2025 Livel (SC) 891 

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – 

Principles of conducting joint or separate trials – i. Separate trials are the rule under Section 218 CrPC, where the offence is committed as part of the same transaction or where the conditions of Sections 219-223 CrPC are fulfilled, joint trials may be permitted, but it is nevertheless a matter of judicial discretion; ii. The decision to conduct joint or separate trials should ordinarily be taken at the outset of the proceedings and on reasonable grounds; iii. Two important considerations in taking such a decision are whether it will cause delay or waste of judicial time; iv. Evidence recorded in one trial cannot be imported into another, which can give rise to serious procedural complications if the trial is bifurcated and; v. An order of conviction or acquittal cannot be set aside merely on the ground that joint or separate trials are possible. [Para 16] Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana,  2025 LiveLaw (SC) 904  : 2025 INSC 1113 

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Sections 218 to 223  –

 

Equality before the law – Article 14 – The order of the trial court to separate the trial, merely on the ground of being a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), is legally temporary and violates the right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution – Although Article 218 establishes a separate trial as the general rule in the Criminal Code, joint trial is an exception permitted, especially when the offences are part of the same transaction – In the present case, since the prosecution’s own case was based on a widespread conspiracy and common evidence, joint trial was appropriate – All accused persons are equal in the eye of the law, and preferential separation on the basis of a person’s public position or dignity violates the principle of equality under Article 14 – Separating the trial of the appellant without any legal or factual necessity amounts to arbitrary classification and undermines the integrity of the criminal justice process.  Mammon Khan v. State of Haryana,  2025 Livel (SC) 904  : 2025 INSC 1113

 

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 432  – Validity of Section 376DA of IPC challenged, where mandatory life imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s life is fixed – Right to seek remission – “Shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life, which means imprisonment for the remainder of the natural life of that person” – It was held that an accused person has the right to seek remission despite the sentence fixed – This right is both a constitutional remedy under Section 72 and Section 161 and a statutory right under provisions like Section 432 of CrPC or BNSS – Each State has its own policy of remission, which reduces the sentence even in the case of death sentence or life imprisonment – A person convicted under Section 376DA or 376DB still has the right to apply for reduction of their sentence – Right to seek remission even if the convict is sentenced to life imprisonment – The Supreme Court has left the question of law open that, Whether it was right to impose mandatory sentence, without discretion.  [Paragraphs 9 – 11] Mahendra Biswanath Kawchale v. Union of India,  2025 Livel (SC) 897

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 438  – Bail and anticipatory bail application – Court has to balance liberty of individuals while considering anticipatory bail against legitimate need of investigation – Severity of charges, misuse of public office and non-cooperation in investigation may outweigh long delay in commencement of case – Personal liberty, especially affecting bail and anticipatory bail, should not be kept hanging indefinitely – Bail Court must be sensitive to constitutional principles and ensure speedy disposal of such matters – Excessive delay in passing orders relating to civil liberty is not in accordance with constitutional mandate under Section 21 – Allegations including misuse of public office and failure to cooperate in investigation of appellants despite long period of interim protection justified denial of anticipatory bail – Cancellation of mutation entry did not nullify the prima facie role of the appellants in certifying their applications – Supreme Court has taken a strict view on excessive delay of High Court in disposing of applications and has emphasized that bail and Importance of speedy disposal of anticipatory bail applications and repeated directions in Satendra Kumar Antil’s case – Such applications should be disposed of within a prescribed time limit – Direction to dispose of bail applications within 2 months – Appeal dismissed.  [Paragraphs 16-18] Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra,  2025 Livel (SC) 901  : 2025 INSC 1114

 

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 438  –

Bail and anticipatory bail applications – The Supreme Court has issued the following guidelines – i. High Courts shall ensure that bail and anticipatory bail applications pending before them or in courts under their jurisdiction are disposed of expeditiously, preferably within 2 months from the date of filing; ii. High Courts shall issue necessary administrative directions to subordinate courts to give priority to matters relating to personal liberty and to avoid indefinite adjournments; iii. Investigating agencies are expected to complete investigations in long pending cases expeditiously so that neither the complainant nor the accused is prejudiced by undue delay; iv. Being the supreme constitutional authority in the States, High Courts shall have to devise suitable mechanisms and procedures to avoid the accumulation of pending bail/anticipatory bail applications and to ensure that the liberty of citizens is not suspended. [Paragraph 18] Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra,  2025 Livel (SC) 901  : 2025 INSC 1114 

 

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482  –  Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 415  – Cheating – FIR quashed – Detention, offence of cheating under Section 420 of IPC, it has to be proved that the false representation was of a material fact which induced the victim to act in a manner which they would not have done otherwise – Since firefighter NOC was not required for obtaining recognition, the allegation of use of fake NOC could not have induced the Education Department to grant recognition – The essential link between the false representation and the alleged inducement was missing, meaning that the essential elements of cheating were not met – Offences under Sections 468 and 471 of IPC were not attracted as there was no dishonest intention to cause wrongful gain or loss, as granting of recognition was not dependent on the alleged fake NOC – Appeal allowed. [Para 15-20] Jupali Laxmikantha Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh,  2025 Livel (SC) 893  : 2025 INSC 1096 

 

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482  – FIR quashed – Supreme Court quashed criminal case against petitioner on grounds of age and unconditional apology before the court – FIR was lodged for ‘objectionable remarks’ made at Jaipur literary conference – Supreme Court condemned petitioner’s statements as ‘highly objectionable’ and considered them unbecoming of a person of his stature, noting that criminal cases were pending for about 12 years and petitioner is now 90 years of age – Supreme Court’s decision to quash charges ‘only on grounds of apology’ – Petition allowed.  [Para 5] Ashish Nandy v. Union of India,  2025 Livel (SC) 896

 

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 21 – Right to life with dignity – Bombay Prevention of Begging Act, 1959 (BPBA)  – Supreme Court has issued guidelines to ensure humane conditions in beggars’ houses across the country – Held, the constitutional framework emphasizes the right to life with dignity under Article 21 and mandates a welfare-centric approach for the vulnerable sections of the population, including inmates of beggars’ houses – Such institutions are not punitive facilities but places of rehabilitation and care, and must adhere to humane conditions consistent with constitutional morality – BPBA and related rules provide the legal background for regulating beggars’ houses, their management and the rights of inmates – Considering the balance between public order and ensuring dignified living and rehabilitation opportunities for inmates – Extensive monitoring system, multiple inspections, reports by authorities and NGOs and continuous reforms in infrastructure, medical facilities, hygiene, nutrition, legal aid and vocational training are mentioned – From punitive detention to social A paradigm shift is mandated through comprehensive rehabilitation in justice and protective custody.  [Paragraphs 11-15, 16, 17, 19-22] MS Pater v. State of NCT of Delhi,  2025 Livel (SC) 908  : 2025 INSC 1115

 

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 21  – Right to life with dignity – The Supreme Court has issued guidelines to ensure humane conditions in beggar shelters across the country under the following subjects – i. Preventive healthcare and sanitation; ii. Infrastructure and capacity; iii. Nutrition and food security; iv. Vocational training and rehabilitation; v. Legal aid and awareness; vi. Child and gender sensitivity; vii. Accountability and supervision – Directed that every State/UT shall constitute a Monitoring Committee for beggar shelters, comprising members of the Social Welfare Department, Public Health Authorities and independent civil society – i. Prepare and publish an annual report on the condition of beggar shelters and; ii. Maintain proper records of illnesses, deaths and remedial action taken; iii. In every case where the death of an inmate occurs due to negligence, lack of basic facilities or failure to provide timely medical care; iv. The State/UT shall pay reasonable compensation to the next of kin of the deceased; v. Initiate departmental and wherever necessary criminal proceedings against the responsible officers; v. State Governments/Union Territories shall maintain a central digital database of all prisoners, recording details of admission, health, training, release and follow-up.  [Paragraph 23] MS Patter v. State of NCT of Delhi,  2025 Livel (SC) 908  : 2025 INSC 1115

 

Constitution of India – Article 21  – Right to fair trial – Right to fair trial is considered a fundamental aspect of Article 21 – Trial Court has ordered separation suo motu, without prior notice or application of prosecution and without giving opportunity to the appellant to be heard – This is a serious procedural and constitutional violation, it has been held that mere physical presence of the counsel does not create a meaningful opportunity for hearing – Trial Court has exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the police to file separate chargesheets against the appellant – Discretion to file chargesheets lies exclusively with the investigating agency – It has been held that even if separate chargesheets are filed, offences arising out of the same transaction should be tried together.  [Paragraphs 14 – 23] Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana,  2025 Livel (SC) 904  : 2025 INSC 1113

 

Constitution of India – Article 21  – Right to asylum – Right to housing is a fundamental right under Article 21 – The central government has been called upon to create a revival fund to provide finance to stressed real estate projects undergoing insolvency proceedings – Buying a house should not be treated as a mere commercial transaction or speculative instrument – The state has a constitutional obligation to create a framework that ensures timely possession of houses and prevents developers from cheating home buyers – Speculative participants driven by profit motive cannot be allowed to misuse the IBC, which is a remedial framework for revival and protection of sick companies – In the case of real estate, the purpose of the IBC is to protect genuine home buyers, the judgment emphasized, making it clear that such speculative investors have alternative remedies through consumer protection laws, RERA or civil courts – The government cannot remain a ‘silent spectator’ and discharge its constitutional duty to protect home buyersPara  20] Manasi Brar Fernandes v. Shubh Sharma,  2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903  : 2025 INSC 1110

 

Dual Pricing Policy – Validity of the interim coal Policy dt. 15.12.2006, which increased the notified price of coal by 20% for the linked consumers of the non-core sector, was examined – The Court reaffirmed that price fixation process violates constitutional mandates or results in hostile discrimination – Judicial review extends to verifying relevant consideration and rational basis in classification but not to re-evaluating economic policy – The classification between core and non-core sector consumers for dual pricing was held to have a rational nexus to the objective of protecting vital national economic interests and common good, as core sector industries consume over 90% of coal and are critical for the economy – Differential pricing was upheld as consistent due to vital public utility functions – Higher prices for non-core industries, producing non-essential goods, can be justified given their minimal impact on the public – Held, only test to ensure that there was no arbitrariness or unfair discriminatory practices at play, was to see whether such dual price fixation was based on reasonable classification in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution – Appellant was held empowered to notify interim prices under the deregulated regime of the Colliery Control Order, 2000 and the there is no restriction on price notification pending policy formulation by the expert committee – The respondents are not entitled to a refund of the excess of the excess amount paid amount paid under Interim Coal Policy absent evidence that they had borne the cost themselves and not passed it on to consumers – Burden was on respondents to prove no unjust enrichment – Set aside order of High Court – Appeal allowed. [Paras 16-19, 52-65, 70-75, 79-88, 96-113, 114-115] Coal India Ltd. v. Rahul Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 907 : 2025 INSC 1103

 

Evidence Law – Circumstantial Evidence – Last seen theory – Supreme Court acquitted accused for rape-murder case, on following grounds – i. Prosecution failed to establish a clear and convincing motive; ii. Testimonies of the witnesses who claimed to have last seen the accused with the victim were unreliable due to significant delays in recording their statements and the fact that they did not see the victim with the accused; iii. The links in the chain of circumstances were broken; iv. There is strong inference of evidence planting; v. the DNA report, which was primary basis for conviction, was considered unreliable and inconsistent – Held that death penalty can only be imposed in the rarest of rare cases on unimpeachable evidence – Trial Court had not properly evaluated mitigating circumstances before awarding it and therefore, the conviction could not be sustained – Supreme Court set aside High Court’s order – Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-12, 51- 56] Akhtar Ali @ Ali Akhtar @ Shamim @ Raja Ustad v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 890 : 2025 INSC 1097

 

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HSA) – Section 29, 8 – Locus standi of State – Validity of will – Rajasthan Escheats Regulation Act, 1956 – Probate of will – Held, State cannot invoke Doctrine of Escheat to challenge a will which is granted probate – Government is a stranger to the property when a Hindu hireless male dies with a will – The state’s locus standi to assail the probate grant was negated by the Court, as the case involved testamentary succession, not intestate succession attracting Section 29 of HAS – The Court emphasized the doctrine of escheat under section 29 applies only when an intestate leaves no heir qualified under the HAS – It has to be ascertained as to whether there are any Class1 or Class 2 heirs, agnates or cognates – Only on the failure of any qualified heir being present to succeed to the properties, under the HAS Act, Section 29 of the said Act would apply as it would be a case of failure of heirs – Since probate was granted by the High Court, the legatees under the will, had the right to succeed – Held that it is only in the event of intestate succession. Section 29 of the HAS Act applying that there would be a devolution of the estate of a deceased male Hindu on the government and not otherwise – Supreme Court imposed Rs. 1 lakh each on Petitioners for suppression and clarified that only heirs or persons entitled to succeed could seek revocation under Section 263 of Indian Succession Act, if probate was wrongfully granted. Appeal dismissed. [Paras 5 – 6] State of Rajasthan v. Ajit Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 906

Insolvency and bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) – Section 7 & 5 – Financial creditor – Homebuyer v. Speculative Investor – Held, a genuine homebuyer under the IBC is one who intends to take physical possession of the residential unit, whereas a ‘speculative investor’ is one who enters a transaction with the sole purpose of generating profits and no intention to obtain possession – the determination of whether an allottee is a speculative investor is a factual inquiry guided by the parties intent, considering factors like the nature of the contract, number of units purchased and presence of assured returns or buy-back clauses – Schemes with assured returns, compulsory buybacks, or excessive exit options are in reality ‘finality derivatives masquerading as housing contracts. [Paras 18-20] Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110

 

Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 65 and Article 59 – Suit for possession – Void v. Voidable document – Held, an instrument of sale is not executed by the owner, it is void ab initio and considered a nullity – If a sale deed is executed without the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, and would be void – In such a case, the owner is not required to seek cancellation of the instrument or a declaration that it is void – A suit for possession based on title can be filed, and it will governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, which provides a limitation period of 12 years from the date the defendant’s possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff – Article 59, which provides a 3 year limitation period, applies to fraudulent transactions that are voidable, not void – High Court erred in applying Article 59 of the Limitation Act – When sale deed is void, suit possession governed by limitation period of 12 years under Article 65 instead of Article 59 – Appeal allowed. [Paras 28-31; 34, 39, 40] Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 900 : 2025 INSC 1105

 

Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 5 – Condonation of delay – State instrumentalities – Public interest – “within such period” – Held, the expression ‘within such period’ under Section 5 of Limitation Act means the entire period from the date the cause of action accrued until the date of actual filing, not just the period after prescribed limitation expired – A party seeking condonation of delay must explain what prevented them from filing the appeal or application within the statutory period of limitation – If the period of limitation is 90 days, and the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation has to be given for the entire 100 days – Total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of officers of the State and its agencies should not be given a premium – Condonation of delay is not a matter of right – while a liberal approach is preferred to achieve substantial justice, negligence and inaction cannot be ignored – A delay should not be condoned merely because doing so would benefit the State – the principle of ‘public interest’ cannot be used to justify the State’s inaction and lethargy – The law of limitation is founded on public policy and is based on the maxims interest reipublicae up sit finis litium and vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniiunt. [Paras 41-50, 59-61, 71] Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 899 : 2025 INSC 1104

 

Medical Negligence – Held, National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) overstepped its jurisdiction by creating a new case that was not based on original complaint – Complainant had not alleged any deficiency in antenatal care, rather, he had asserted that tests were prescribed and undergone – A decision must be based on the case pleaded and that a party cannot travel beyond its pleadings – Multiple medical boards, constituted at the request of the complaint, had reviewed the case and found no ‘gross medical negligence’ in the management of the patient by the treating doctors – The doctor cannot be held liable for an unfavourable outcome without strong evidence of negligence, and that Courts and Consumer Forums should not substitute their own views for those of medical specialists – Appeal allowed and directed complainant to return Rs. 10 lakhs. [Paras 23-30] Deep Nursing Home v. Manmeet Singh Mattewal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2025 INSC 1094

 

Vacancies in NCLT, NCLAT to be filled on war-time basis – Adequate staff to be appointed in RERA – Dedicated IBC Benches to be constituted with additional strength – Services of retired judges may be utilized on ad hoc basis till regular appointments are made – It is noted that although such directions were issued earlier, no effective action has been taken – The Central Government has been directed to file a compliance report within three months on the measures taken to upgrade the infrastructure of NCLT/NCLAT across the country – The recent closure of parts of Chandigarh NCLT and Delhi NCLT due to waterlogging in courtrooms and members’ chambers stresses the urgency of strong infrastructural support – It is noted that the Government will give priority to e-filing, video conferencing and dedicated case management system for IBS matters. [Para 24] Mansi Brar Fernandez v. Shubha Sharma,  2025 Livel (SC) 903  : 2025 INSC 1110 

 

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138, terms of section 142  – Supreme Court dismissed the complaint and held that there can be no ‘automatic or presumed remission’ of a complaint filed outside the statutory time limit – When a complaint is filed outside the statutory time limit, the complainant has to file a proper application or affidavit showing the reasons for delay – The High Court’s view that a separate application for remission of delay under section 142(b) of the Act is not a ‘statutory order’ was also wrong – Court is bound to take note of the complaint filed outside the time limit, consider the reasons shown for delay and reach a ‘prudent conclusion’ that remission is justified before taking cognizance of the case and issuing summons. [Paragraphs 6-9] HS Oberoi Buildtech Pvt Ltd v MSN Woodtech,  2025 Livel (SC) 889 

 

Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 299, 300 and 307  – Cause and proximate cause in manslaughter – Whether death after a few days of fatal injury is an offence of murder – The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that, for conviction of murder under Sections 299 and 300 IPC, death must be a direct consequence of the injury, even if delayed by complications like septicaemia or pneumonia – Only lapse of time or intervening medical circumstances do not disrupt the natural course unless they constitute an independent supervening factor to remove the nexus between the injury and death – As per Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC, the adequacy or efficiency of the treatment given to the victim is held to be entirely irrelevant in determining criminal liability under Section 302 IPC – If the injuries are of a dangerous nature, the trespasser is liable for the fatal complications, irrespective of the probable recovery by the best medical care – Delay of death due to medical complications or prolonged treatment is a ground for conviction of the offender from murder Manslaughter does not reduce liability – Proof of intent or knowledge as defined under Section 300 IPC is required for conviction under Section 307 IPC – Even if the injuries are not fatal, intent inferred from the weapon used, body part targeted and continuous attack is decisive – High Court erred in converting the conviction of murder from attempt to murder on the basis of mere allegation of long survival of the victim and lack of proper medical treatment – Appeal dismissed.  [Paras 25-27, 30, 31, 40-49, 57, 59-61, 66, 67] Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh,  2025 Livel (SC) 905  : 2025 INSC 1107

 

Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 299, 300 and 307 –  The Supreme Court has laid down the essential principles to be followed by the Court in cases where death is delayed by injury – i. If the injury is fatal and intended to cause death, thenit is murder under section 300 (Part I), even if death is delayed by complications; ii. If the injuries are sufficient to cause death in general, then it is murder under section 300 (Part III), notwithstanding delayed death; iii. If the injuries are imminently dangerous to life, then it is murder under section 300 (Part IV), irrespective of treatment or complications; iv. If complications arise from the injury, the accused is liable for the death; v. If the complications are remote, then it may be culpable homicide, if unavoidable, then it is murder under section 302; vi. Even if no single injury is sufficient, the Court may presume intent to kill if the injuries are collectively fatal; vii. The court must see that the injuries were likely to cause death naturally, intervening factors do not reduce liability unless they are very remote. [Para 69] Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh,  2025 Livel (SC) 905  : 2025 INSC 1107  

 

Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 302, 304 – Right of private defence – It is held that the right of private defence is a valuable right which serves a social purpose and should not be interpreted narrowly – It cannot be weighed on a ‘golden scale’ or with ‘mathematical precision’ – The court must look at the situation from the perspective of an ordinary and reasonable person, not with ‘detached objectivity’ or ‘highly technical approach’ – When a person is faced with an imminent threat, such as being shot by an attacker, it is unreasonable to expect them to use ‘reasonable mind’ – The right of private defence can be invoked when there is a reasonable apprehension of an offence and the offence does not need to be actually committed – The force used should not be unnecessary, but the person is in ‘imminent and reasonable danger’ of death or serious injury and is likely to cause harm to their attacker, even extending to death – Since the deceased was the primary attacker and attacked the appellant with a pistol With, the appellant’s retaliatory conduct was a just act of self-defence – appeal allowed. [Paragraphs 6 – 8] Rakesh Dutt Sharma v. State of Uttarakhand,  2025 Livel (SC) 892 

 

Penal Code, 1860 – Section 306  – Abetment to suicide – Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Section 3(2)(v) – The Supreme Court acquitted the appellant and held that – i. The case of the State, at its highest, shows that the long-standing neighbourhood dispute between the family had become more acute; ii. The appellant was acquitted of all other offences including unlawful assembly, riot, assault and criminal intimidation and this acquittal has become final; iii. For an offence under Section 306 IPC, there must be clear malevolent motive and direct or active act which leaves the deceased no option but to commit suicide; iv. Unreasonable words spoken in anger without any intention of consequence do not constitute incitement – Held that the harassment faced by the victim does not constitute incitement to such an extent that he has no option but to take his life – Conviction and order of the High Court set aside – Appeal allowed. [Para 17-23] Geetha v. State of Karnataka,  2025 Livel (SC) 888  : 2025 INSC 1089 

 

Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) – Supreme Court allows plea for change in schedule of Pharmacy courses in view of proposed schedule – This new schedule will be effective from the academic year 2026-2027 – Extension application for the academic year 2025-2026 has also been allowed, the deadline for completion of approval process has been extended to September 30, 2025 and the deadline for consent/appeal has been extended to October 10, 2025 – The proposed schedule will start the academic year from August 1 and the last date for admission of students is August 15 – The new schedule will also include a one-month extension period for use of PCI in case of unforeseen circumstances. [Paragraphs 5, 6] Parswanath Charitable Trust v. All India Council for Technical Education,  2025 Livel (SC) 895 

 

Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016 – Sections 14, 19, 21  – The Indian legal framework on disability rights has evolved from a charitable to a rights-based framework – This change is driven by statutory law and constitutional mandate – The Act was framed in line with India’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) – It guarantees substantive rights including community living and protection from abuse – The judiciary has played a significant role in interpreting Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution to reframe disability as a structural disadvantage requiring active redress and inclusion – Failure to ensure accessibility constitutes systemic exclusion and violates the Equal Protection Clause of Article 14 – Reasonable accommodation is essential for substantive equality under Article 14, but has also cautioned against valuing a person with disability in terms of productivity – The Supreme Court has reserved seats in the general category for persons with disabilities who score above the cut-off marks Concerns raised over deprivation of reserved category – Central Government directed to explain whether proper steps have been taken to ensure ‘upward positioning’ by placing PWDs who score more than the general cut-off in the general category – The direct consequence of not granting upward positioning to meritorious candidates applying under the PWD category will be that, despite scoring more than the cut-off of the unreserved category, such candidates will always occupy reserved seats thereby depriving PWD candidates scoring less than the cut-off of the said post – This defeats the purpose of reservation under Section 34 – A scheme called ‘Project Empowerment’ has been directed to be implemented under the RPwD Act, 2016 under the name and style of ‘Project Empowerment’ and the work has been entrusted to 8 NLUs across the country and the project report has to be submitted within 6 months.  Reena Banerjee v. Government of NCT of Delhi,  2025 LiveLaw (SC) 898  : 2025 INSC 1101

 

Protection of interests of homebuyers – The Supreme Court has directed that every residential real estate transaction for new housing projects shall be registered with the local revenue authority by payment of at least 20% of the property value by the buyer – To protect senior citizens and genuine homebuyers, agreements which deviate significantly from the model RERA sale agreement, or where the allottee is above 50 years of age, include a return/buyback clause, shall be supported by an affidavit before the appropriate revenue authority, attesting that the allottee understands the potential risks – It is envisaged that, in early stage projects, such as 2 where land has not yet been acquired or construction has not commenced, the money received from the allottees will be deposited in an escrow account and disbursed in phases commensurate with the progress of the project as per RERA-approved SOPs – Each RERA will formulate such SOPs within 6 months.  [Para 21] Manasi Brar Fernandes v. Shubh Sharma,  2025 Live Law (SC) 903  : 2025 INSC 1110

 

Service Act – Transfer of reserved category candidates to unreserved category – Relaxation – Held, Office Memorandum, which prohibits migration for candidates who have obtained ‘relaxed standards’ like age and experience, is not applicable to relaxation of physical standards like height, weight and chest – Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between relaxation of age, experience and written test standards and variation in physical measurements – Different physical standards for sex, caste or geographical location are not ‘relaxation’ in the same sense as relaxation of age or experience – These are separate parameters for different categories of candidates – Acceptance of physical relaxation does not prevent a reserved candidate from selection to general category unless the rules prohibit it.  [Paragraphs 9-12] Uma Shankar Gurjar v. Union of India,  2025 Livel (SC) 886  : 2025 INSC 1083

 

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Remedies) Act, 2013 – Sections 2(n), 3(2), 9  – Complaint of sexual harassment filed outside the time limit prescribed under Section 9 – Whether subsequent administrative action against the appellant would be considered as sexual harassment under the Act to extend the period of limitation – It was held that the complaint of sexual harassment must be filed within 3 months of the last incident or within an extended period of 3 months, for a total of 6 months – The definition of sexual harassment includes unwanted acts of a sexual nature and situations such as implicit or explicit threat of harmful conduct at work or creating a hostile work environment – For subsequent actions to be considered as part of sexual harassment, there must be a direct link between the new action and the previous overt sexual harassment – If the injury continues, there is a ‘continuous wrong’ and ‘repeated wrong’, where each time a fresh cause of action arises – The administrative action taken against the appellant, such as his removal as a director, was a collective decision of the Executive Council on the basis of independent complaints – These actions were administrative were in nature and did not create a gender-based hostile environment – These were not directly linked to previous sexual harassment and did not constitute a continuing wrong – The last incident of sexual harassment occurred in April 2023 and the complaint filed in December 2023 was within the time limit – VC-Reporter No. 1 is directed to mention the judgment in his resume – Appeal dismissed.  [Paragraphs 14 – 32] Banita Patnaik v. Nirmal Kanti Chakraborty,  2025 Livel (SC) 902  : 2025 INSC 1106

 

Tender – Ineligibility of Tender – Judicial Review – Held, a tender cannot be rejected merely for want of documents prescribed in the NIT as per the Notice of Invitation to Tender (NIT) – Tendering Authority cannot impose conditions not expressly mentioned in the tender documents – The disqualification was invalid for the following reasons- i. Clause 5(D) of the NIT did not expressly mandate submission of JV agreement to prove proportionate share; the work completion certificate furnished by the appellant, in which its 45% share in the JV (Joint Venture) was expressly mentioned, was a valid document for this purpose; ii. The conditions of the tender must be clear and unambiguous – Since the NIT did not expressly require JV agreement, the tendering authority could not reject the tender for non-submission thereof; ii. Rejection of the tender as ‘incomplete’ under Clause 8.1 was contrary to the terms of the NIT as the required work completion certificate was submitted; iv. The decision of the High Court to disqualify the appellant on the basis of the Washree Committee under Section 5(b) was improper beyond the reasons given by the Tender Evaluation Committee – partly upheld and the matter remitted to the High Court for fresh decision.  [Paragraphs 13 – 24] Maha Mineral Mining and Facilities v. Madhya Pradesh Power Generating Co.,  2025 Livel (SC) 885  : 2025 INSC 1085

   

Source – Livell

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