Supreme Court Annual Digest 2025- Service Law

Alteration of Selection Criteria – Weightage of Qualifications – Jammu and Kashmir Services Selection Board (Board) – Recruitment of Foresters – Academic Qualification for Forester – Held that the minimum academic qualification for the post of Forester was or equivalent with Science – Stress was primarily on physical attributes and viva voce, not solely academic criteria – The Board initially provided 25 points for a B.Sc. Forestry degree out of a total of 100 points – After conducting interviews, the Board changed the evaluation criteria, differentiating between a 4-year B.Sc. Forestry course (awarded 25 points) and a 3-year B.Sc. Forestry course (awarded 20 points) – Altering the evaluation procedure after the interviews were held, when candidates had completed their participation in the selection process, was found to be arbitrary and lacking a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved – Held that the change in the evaluation criteria was made at the stage of preparation of the select list and was deemed arbitrary by the Supreme Court – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. (2008) 3 SCC 512; Tej Prakash Pathak v. High Court of Rajasthan (2025) 2 SCC 1; Paras 10, 11] J and K Service Selection Board v. Sudesh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1156

 

 
Annual Increment for Retirees – Held, government employees are entitled to an annual increment earned the day before retirement, as per Director (Admn and HR) KPTCL v. CP Mundinamani (11.04.2023). This entitlement applies prospectively to third parties from 01.05.2023, with enhanced pension including one increment payable from that date. No enhanced pension is payable for the period before 30.04.2023. For employees who succeeded in prior writ petitions, the judgment operates as res judicata, entitling them to enhanced pension with one increment as per the judgment, unless the judgment is under appeal and not final. Retired employees who filed applications for intervention, impleadment, writ petitions, or original applications before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), High Courts, or Supreme Court are entitled to enhanced pension with one increment for the three years prior to the month of filing, as per modified direction issued on 20.02.2025. Applications filed after Union of India & Anr. v. M. Siddaraj (19.05.2023) are governed by the prospective application rule and not the modified direction. Excess payments or arrears already made will not be recovered. Aggrieved parties may approach relevant authorities for non-compliance and, if necessary, the CAT or High Court as per law. Union of India v.. M. Siddaraj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 258

 

 
Appointment in excess of advertised vacancies – Termination – Justification of termination – Scope of Rule 12 of the relevant Rules – Maintenance of Wait List – Complete Justice- Held that Rule 12 was interpreted in Naseem Ahmad case to permit a waiting list of ‘reasonable dimensions’ to be maintained, which is adequate to meet vacancies that might be available within a reasonable period in the year of recruitment or the year succeeding thereto – The explicit rider in the advertisement that the vacancies could be increased or decreased indicated the Appointing Authority’s intention to maintain a wait list to fill up excess vacancies, as permissible under the rules – Given that the next advertisement was only after 8 years (in 2008), it was evident that vacancies arose within that period, justifying the appellants’ appointments subsequent to the twelve advertised vacancies – Held that the termination was found to be unjustified. [Relied on Naseem Ahmad and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2011) 2 SCC 734; Paras 6,7,10,11,12] Sanjay Kumar Mishra v. District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar (UP), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1031

 

  Aside Midway Criteria Change In BPSC Asst. Engineer Recruitment
Armed Forces Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2008; Rule 18 – Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982; Rules 5, 9 and 14 – Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Disability Pension – Invalided Soldier – Presumption of Disability Due to Military Service – Burden on Army to Prove Otherwise – Soldier invalided out of service due to disability presumed to have incurred disability from military service unless proven otherwise by the Army – No requirement for soldier to prove disease was contracted or aggravated by military service – Disability leading to invalidation presumed to be above 20%, entitling soldier to 50% disability pension – Beneficial provision to be interpreted liberally – Army directed to grant 50% disability pension with 6% interest on arrears from 01.01.1996 for life, payable within three months. (Paras 44 – 46) Bijender Singh v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 477 : 2025 INSC 549 : AIR 2025 SC 2130

Banking Service – UCO Bank Pension Regulations, 1995 – Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 2(p) and 18(1) – Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957; Rule 58 – Bipartite Settlement, 1966 – An employee dismissed for misconduct after completing over ten years of service is entitled to pensionary benefits under the Bipartite Settlement. Regulation 22 which denies pension to removed employees, does not override Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement, which has statutory force under the Industrial Disputes Act. An employee meeting the minimum qualifying service requirement cannot be denied pension, regardless of misconduct, harmonizing the provisions to uphold the employee’s superannuation benefits. Appeal dismissed. (Para 14, 17 & 22) Uco Bank v. Vijay Kumar Handa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 390 : 2025 INSC 442 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1484

 

Banking Service – Union Bank of India Officer Employees’ (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976; Regulation 19 – Disciplinary Proceedings – Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) – Procedural Fairness – Mala Fides – Retirement Benefits – Whether the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and issuance of a charge sheet by Union Bank of India against a former employee, without obtaining the Central Vigilance Commission’s (CVC) first-stage advice in a vigilance-related case, violated procedural fairness and the Bank’s regulations. Held, the Bank’s actions, initiated just before the appellant’s retirement after 34 years of unblemished service, breached procedural fairness, particularly as the Bank had assured the High Court that the charge sheet would be issued only after receiving CVC advice. The Supreme Court quashed the disciplinary proceedings, finding the Bank’s failure to obtain and consider CVC’s first-stage advice before issuing the charge sheet arbitrary, mala fide, and in violation of Regulation 19 and CVC circulars. The appeal was allowed, the charge sheet and disciplinary proceedings were set aside, and the Bank was directed to release the appellant’s full retirement benefits, excluding back wages. (Para 21) A.M. Kulshrestha v. Union Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2025 INSC 744 : AIR 2025 SC 2520

 

Biometric Attendance System – Introduction without Prior Consultation – Issue – Challenge to the introduction of a Biometric Attendance System in the Office of Principal Accountant General (A&E), Odisha, via Circulars dated 01.07.2013, 22.10.2023, and 06.11.2013 – Supreme Court noted that the employees were not opposed to the introduction of the Biometric Attendance System, which was accepted by their counsel – Since the employees had no reservation, no controversy survived for adjudication, and the department could proceed with implementation – Held that the exercise undertaken by the High Court was “totally unnecessary” – The court ruled that when the introduction of the Biometric Attendance System is for the benefit of all stakeholders, the mere fact that the employees were not consulted before implementation does not render the introduction of the system to be illegal – Appeal allowed. [Paras 7 – 10] Union of India v. Dilip Kumar Rout, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1063

 

Caste Certificate – Plea to submit caste certificates beyond cut-off date – OBCNCL/MBC-NCL certificates valid for one year, extendable to three with affidavit – appellants lacked valid certificates at application deadline – No relaxation permissible – As per relevant law, rules and instructions, a certificate of a claim, as put forth by the appellants, was valid for 1 year from the date of issuance, and subsequently, extendable up to 3 years, provided an affidavit to the said effect was also produced along with the originally issued certificate. A claim made by a candidate, while filling their application as per the concerned advertisement, was to hold good as on the date of his or her application or as per the last date of submission of applications prescribed by the concerned advertisement. Thereupon, considering the date of issuance of the category certificates in the appellants’ case, none of them had a valid certificate and/or accompanied by the affidavit as per the proforma at the relevant time as per requirement. (Para 33, 36 – 38) Sakshi Arha v. Rajasthan High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2025 INSC 463 : AIR 2025 SC 2232

 

Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) – Appeals by Group-A officers of CRPF, BSF, SSB, ITBP, and CISF seeking OGAS status and relief from promotional stagnation due to IPS deputation – Directions – Complete cadre review for all CAPFs within six months. Review and amend service and recruitment rules within six months with cadre officers’ inputs. DoPT to decide on action taken reports within three months. Progressively reduce deputation posts up to SAG level within two years. (Para 45) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779

 

Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) – Whether CAPFs qualify as Organised Group-A Services (OGAS) for cadre-related matters, including cadre review and service benefits, and whether deputation of Indian Police Service (IPS) officers to CAPFs causes promotional stagnation for CAPF officers, necessitating reduction. Held, CAPFs are recognised as OGAS for all purposes, including cadre management and service benefits, as per DoPT OM dated 12 July 2019. All OGAS benefits must extend to CAPFs. Central Government directed to complete cadre reviews for all CAPFs and amend recruitment rules within six months to align with OGAS status. To address promotional stagnation, deputation posts up to Senior Administrative Grade (SAG) level to be progressively reduced within two years to enhance promotion prospects for CAPF officers. Ministry of Home Affairs to review service and recruitment rules with inputs from CAPF cadre officers within six months; DoPT to act on reports within three months. Deputation policies remain Central Government’s prerogative, but CAPF officers’ grievances regarding stagnation and recognition must be addressed to uphold morale. (Paras 43 & 44) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779

 

Central Bank of India (Employers’) Pension Regulations, 1995 – Regulation 33 – Compulsory Retirement Pension – Interpretation of ‘may’ in Regulation 33(1) and conjoint reading of Regulation 33(1) and 33(2) – Issue – the disciplinary inquiry against appellant was continued under Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Central Bank of India (Officer’s) Service Regulations, 1979 even after his superannuation on November 30, 2014 and pension was reduced without consultation – the Supreme Court clarified that the word “may” in Regulation 33(1) does not grant discretion to superior authority to award less than two-third of full pension – It signifies that a compulsorily retired employees is not entitled to pension if they are not otherwise eligible for it on superannuation (e.g. not completing “qualifying service”). The Court held that Regulation 33(1) and 33(2) must be read conjointly – In all cases where the full pension is admissible to a compulsorily retired employee is reduced, prior consultation with Board of Directors is directory – Prior consultation with the Board of Directors, the highest authority of the Bank is a mandatory safeguard before an employee’s constitutional right to pension is curtailed – a post-facto approval cannot substitute the requirement of prior consultation. [Relied Indian Administrative Service (S.C.S.) Association, U.P. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., (1993) Supp (1) SCC 730; Paras 16, 18, 19, 21] Vijay Kumar v. Central Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 713 : 2025 INSC 848

 

Central Bank of India (Employers’) Pension Regulations, 1995 – Regulation 33 – Compulsory Retirement Pension – ‘Competent Authority’ – must be superior to the delinquent and not an officer holding rank lower than scale IV officer – Competent authority can award pension in exercise of not only original but also appellate or reviewing powers – Term ‘competent authority’ cannot be restricted to disciplinary authority alone. [Paras 15] Vijay Kumar v. Central Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 713 : 2025 INSC 848

 

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965; Rules 13 & 14 – Initiation of Disciplinary Proceedings – Respondent challenged charge-sheet being void as issued without approval of the appointing authority or disciplinary authority – High Court allowed Writ Petition filed by Respondent concluding that a charge memo under Rule 14, issued by an authority competent to inflict minor penalties and requires approval from authority competent to inflict major penalties -Held, an authority competent to impose minor penalties can issue a charge-sheet even for the imposition of major penalties under Rule 14 of the CCS CCA Rules, 1965 – This is permissible as per a plain reading of Rule 13(2) when read with Rule 14 and Appendix 3 of the Rules – Chargesheet was issued by General Manager, Telecommunications who is competent to impose minor penalties and is the competent authority for major penalties as per Appendix 3 of the CCS CCA Rules – The inquiry did not suffer from any procedural irregularity and the final order was passed by the competent disciplinary authority – Set aside order of High Court – Appeal allowed. [Paras 14-18] Union of India v. R. Shankarappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 750 : 2025 INSC 898

 

Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972; Rule 2(g) and 17 – Contractual service period of government employees must be included for pensionary benefits once they are regularised. Interpreting Rule 17 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, the Court overruled the exclusion of contractual employees under Rule 2(g), stating that the entire service period, including contractual and regular service, counts for pension purposes. The Court directed the Union of India to facilitate the exercise of options under Rule 17 and notify the amounts payable for pension benefits. (Referred: State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sheela Devi, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1272, Para 8 & 9) S.D. Jayaprakash v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2025 INSC 594

Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules, 1977 (Karnataka); Rule 16(a)(iii) – Government Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1957 (Karnataka); Rule 6 – Cadre Change at Employee’s Request – Effect on Seniority – the Tribunal as well as the High Court committed an error in directing the appellant to grant seniority to the respondent in the cadre of First Division Assistant with effect from the date in which the said respondent has entered service in the cadre of Staff Nurse from 05.01.1979, instead of 19.04.1989, when she was appointed in the new cadre of First Division Assistant. (Para 24) Secretary to Government Department v. K.C. Devaki, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2025 INSC 389

 

Compassionate Appointment – Applicable Scheme – Date of Death vs. Date of Consideration – Conflicting Precedents – Terminal Benefits – Retrospective Application – Canara Bank Scheme 1993/2005 – Merits of Claim – No severe financial hardship was demonstrated post-death to warrant compassionate appointment. The widow and respondent (son) were the only dependents; married daughters were settled. The High Court’s direction under the 1993 Scheme was set aside, and the appeal allowed by dismissing the respondent’s claim. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Compassionate Appointment – Civil Death – Date of Death – Decree of Civil Court – Evidence Act, 1872; Section 108 – Presumption of Death (Civil Death) – Held, in cases of civil death, a person is presumed to be dead only if their whereabouts are not heard of for seven years from the date the person went missing – The death will be presumed to be on the expiry of seven years from the date the person disappeared, unless a contrary or specific date of death is proved by adducing cogent evidence – A decree of a Civil Court declaring a person to be dead, pursuant to the seven-year statutory period having elapsed, does not, by itself, fix a precise date or time of death – The decree is silent on the specific date of death unless direct or circumstantial evidence is provided – The burden to prove the date or time of the death lies upon the person who makes such an assertion. [Relied on LIC v. Anuradha, (2004) 10 SCC 131; Paras 6, 7] Commissioner, Nagpur Municipal Corporation v. Lalita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1065 : 2025 INSC 1280

 

Compassionate Appointment – Civil Death – Retirement and Acceptance of Retiral Dues: Where the missing employee was treated to be in continuous service and duly retired during the period he was missing, and his family members accepted all the retiral dues and are receiving monthly pension, the family has accepted the father’s retirement. In these circumstances, the son (Respondent No. 2) cannot claim compassionate appointment, as the father is deemed to have died a civil death after his retirement date – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and allowed the appeal – The Court left it open to the appellants to consider the case of the respondent for appointment for any suitable post independent of the claim for compassionate appointment, if otherwise permissible in law – Appeal allowed. [Paras 4,9, 10-12] Commissioner, Nagpur Municipal Corporation v. Lalita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1065 : 2025 INSC 1280

 

Compassionate Appointment – Conflicting Judicial Precedents on Applicable Scheme – The Court flagged ongoing uncertainty, noting divergent views across decisions – Date of Death View (Binding Precedent): Abhishek Kumar v. State of Haryana (2006) 12 SCC 44; Canara Bank v. M. Mahesh Kumar (2015) 7 SCC 412; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Amit Shrivas (2020) 10 SCC 496; Indian Bank v. Promila (2020) 2 SCC 729; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ashish Awasthi (2023) [Implied Reference]. These hold that claims must be decided under the scheme existing at the date of death, absent retrospective application of a subsequent scheme. No vested right accrues on death to demand consideration under a prior scheme if superseded. – Date of Consideration View: SBI v. Raj Kumar (2010) 11 SCC 661; MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh (2014) 13 SCC 583; N.C. Santhosh v. State of Karnataka (2020) 7 SCC 617. These apply norms prevailing at the time of application consideration, as no vested right exists post-death. The Court observed that three-judge Bench decisions in N.C. Santhosh (supra) and Amit Shrivas (supra) are at variance, and the reference to a larger Bench in State Bank of India v. Sheo Shankar Tewari (2019) 5 SCC 600 remains undecided. It debated retrospective application of executive schemes but deferred resolution, noting an existing reference. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

 

Compassionate Appointment – Deceased bank employee left behind widow, unmarried son (respondent, now overage for entry-level post), and three married daughters (not dependents). Family received family pension of Rs. 4,637.92 (deemed sufficient for two dependents) and terminal benefits of Rs. 3.09 lakh. High Court directed appointment and Rs. 5 lakh compensation, upheld on appeal with costs. Impugned High Court orders set aside; compassionate appointment denied for absence of indigence. However, invoking inherent powers and prior coordinate bench observations, employer directed to pay respondent lump sum ex-gratia of Rs. 2.5 lakh within two months as final settlement, considering generated expectations from litigation success. (Para 32, 44, 49) Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

 

Compassionate Appointment – Delay in Claim – A lapse of over two decades in pursuing the claim (father’s death in 2001; claim assessed in 2025) does not automatically bar consideration where the dependent has diligently litigated against the employer and courts. Respondent’s current age is irrelevant if merits are otherwise assessable. (Para 27, 28) Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

 

Compassionate Appointment – Disagreement with Canara Bank (2015): Overruling aspects of Canara Bank v. M. Mahesh Kumar (supra), the Court held that Clause 3.2 (keeping offers open for minors till majority) is a benevolent provision for human dignity, not linked to terminal benefits. Grant of family pension/terminal benefits does not bar compassionate claims, as they serve distinct purposes. However, judicial propriety precluded referral to a larger Bench, given the pending Sheo Shankar Tewari reference and the claim’s two-decade pendency. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

 

Compassionate Appointment – Principles – 1. Exception to Equality: Compassionate appointment, offered on humanitarian grounds, is an exception to the constitutional principle of equality in public employment. 2. Rule-Based: It cannot be granted without specific rules or instructions. 3. Purpose: Aimed at addressing sudden financial crises due to the death or medical incapacitation of the family’s breadwinner. 4. Immediacy: Appointments must be made promptly to alleviate distress, and delayed applications may be rejected. 5. Strict Interpretation: As a side-door entry, rules must be strictly interpreted. 6. Not a Right: Compassionate appointment is a concession, not a vested right, and depends on fulfilling eligibility criteria, including financial indigence. 7. No Inheritance: It cannot be claimed as an inherited right or based solely on descent. 8. Financial Need: The family’s financial distress is a primary condition; terminal benefits and other income sources are considered to assess penury. 9. No Reservation: Vacancies cannot be reserved for minors until they attain majority unless specified by rules. 10. Judicial Restraint: Courts cannot grant compassionate appointments outside statutory regulations or based solely on sympathy. The Court underscored that compassionate appointments are not meant to provide endless support or bypass constitutional safeguards under Articles 14 and 16, ensuring fairness and objectivity in the process. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

 

Compassionate Appointment – Scope and Criteria – Held, compassionate appointments under schemes for dependents of deceased employees dying in harness are to be granted only in “hand-to-mouth” cases where the family is below the poverty line and struggling with basic expenses like food, rent, and utilities due to lack of steady sustenance. Such relief is not warranted merely for a fall in standard of life following the breadwinner’s death. There is no straitjacket formula; each case must be assessed on its peculiar financial condition, with indigence of dependents being the fundamental precondition. Failure to prove such indigence renders the claim untenable, as it would otherwise create an impermissible reservation conflicting with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (Para 29) Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

 

Compassionate Appointment – The respondent’s father, an employee of Canara Bank, died in 2001 prior to retirement. The respondent sought compassionate appointment under the Canara Bank Compassionate Appointment Scheme, 1993. During pendency of High Court proceedings, the Bank introduced the 2005 Scheme, replacing appointments with lump-sum ex-gratia payments, and discontinued the 1993 Scheme via circular. The High Court directed appointment under the 1993 Scheme, leading to the Bank’s appeal. Whether, for compassionate appointment claims, the applicable scheme is that prevalent on the date of the employee’s death or on the date of consideration of the application. Effect of family pension and terminal benefits on eligibility for compassionate appointment under the 1993 Scheme. Interpretation of Clause 3.2 of the 1993 Scheme regarding minors and terminal benefits – Discussed. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

 

Conflict in Advertisement Clauses – Interpretation of ‘Eligibility in every respect’ – Where a “Notice” in a re-notified advertisement claims eligibility conditions from an earlier deactivated advertisement remain unchanged, but Clause 9(b)of the same detailed advertisement explicitly states that eligibility “in every respect” shall be determined by the closing date of the Online Recruitment Application, a conjoint reading reveals a clear divergence – Held that the eligibility date must be the actual closing date of application submission as prescribed in the detailed advertisement- Noted that the UPSC’s note-sheets failed to provide any justification for retaining an old cut-off date from a deactivated advertisement, especially when the selection portal was not even functional during the initial period – Appeals allowed. [Paras 7-13] Kailash Prasad v. Union Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1168

 

Constitution of India; Article 245 – Principle of Functus Officio – Applicability to Executive Rule-Making Authority – the principle of functus officio does not apply to executive rule-making authority under Article 245 of the Constitution of India and is limited to judicial or quasi-judicial forums. Applying functus officio to the State’s rule-making power would cripple executive functions and paralyze governance. The State is not required to provide a prior hearing to affected individuals during the exercise of its rule-making authority, as such a requirement would impose undue procedural constraints and undermine efficient policy implementation. The High Court’s decision quashing a revised memorandum on the grounds of functus officio and lack of prior hearing was held to be untenable and ultra vires the Constitution. The impugned judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. (Para 42, 45, 47) P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2025 INSC 212 : AIR 2025 SC 1335 : (2025) 4 SCC 127

 

Constitution of India – Article 226 – Acquittal in a criminal case based on the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard does not bar departmental disciplinary proceedings against a public servant, which are governed by the “preponderance of probabilities” standard. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s Division Bench decision setting aside the dismissal of an Assistant Engineer (Civil) at the Airports Authority of India (AAI), who was acquitted in a corruption case but dismissed following a departmental inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority is not obligated to address every ground raised by the delinquent officer or provide exhaustive reasons in disciplinary orders, provided the findings are supported by a reasoned conclusion and evidence establishing guilt on the preponderance of probabilities. In an intra-court writ appeal, the Appellate Court must exercise restraint, and interference with the Single Judge’s judgment is permissible only if it is perverse or suffers from an apparent error of law. The Supreme Court upheld the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities’ decisions, reinstating the respondent’s dismissal, and found the Single Judge’s dismissal of the respondent’s writ petition to be well-reasoned. Appeal allowed; respondent’s dismissal from service reinstated. (Paras 33, 34, 37 & 38) Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2025 INSC 149 : AIR 2025 SC 1052 : (2025) 4 SCC 111

 

Constitution of India – Article 311 doesn’t mean only appointing authority can initiate disciplinary action against government servant. The appointing authority is not required to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a state employee. While the appointing authority’s approval is necessary for dismissal, it is not required for initiating disciplinary action. The High Court’s decision, which quashed the state employee’s dismissal solely due to the lack of prior separate approval from the Chief Minister for the charge sheet, is erroneous. (Para 33, 34 & 39) State of Jharkhand v. Rukma Kesh Mishra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : 2025 INSC 412 : AIR 2025 SC 1656

 

Consumer Forum – Qualification for appointment – A bunch of appeals and review petitions arose from Bombay High Court orders invalidating aspects of the Consumer Protection (Qualification for appointment, method of recruitment, procedure of appointment, term of office, resignation and removal of the President and members of the State Commission and District Commission) Rules, 2020 (“2020 Rules”), concerning appointments to consumer fora under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, particularly in Maharashtra. In Impugned Order I, the Bombay High Court struck down Rule 6(1) of the 2020 Rules for executive dominance in the selection process (violating judicial independence per Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Limited, (2020) 6 SCC 1, Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2021) 7 SCC 369 (“MBA – III”), and Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2022) 12 SCC 455 (“MBA – IV”)) and partially invalidated Rule 10(2) on tenure extensions; absent clear reappointment rules, it applied Rule 8(18) of the Consumer Protection (Appointment, Salary, Allowances, and Conditions of Service of President and Members of State Commission and District Forum) Rules, 2019, temporarily. Impugned Order II clarified that directions in Secretary, Ministry of Consumer Affairs v. Dr. Mahindra Bhaskar Limaye, [2023 SCC OnLine SC 231] (“Limaye – I”) on written examinations apply only to non-judicial members of State Commissions and District Commission members. Impugned Order III (Telangana High Court) set aside District Commission appointments predating Limaye – I. The Supreme Court examined consumerism’s constitutional foundations under Articles 38, 39, and 47, its evolution, and the adequacy of tenure-based grievance redressal mechanisms. Issues: (i) Feasibility of a permanent adjudicatory forum (e.g., Consumer Tribunal or Consumer Court) for consumer disputes, replacing or supplementing tenure-based appointments with permanent judicial/non-judicial members, staff, and Presiding Officers (potentially headed by sitting judges), alongside enhanced strength and infrastructure; (ii) Notification of revised recruitment rules ensuring judicial independence (majority judicial selection committees), efficiency (five-year tenures per precedents), and differentiated processes (no examinations for judicial posts; mandatory for non-judicial); (iii) Validity of 2020 Rules’ provisions on selection committees, examinations, and reappointments; (iv) Scope of Limaye – I directions; (v) Status of existing/pending appointments, terminations, and recruitments amid transitions. Held: Upholding consumerism as a constitutionally embedded right integral to participatory democracy, economic activity, and environmental justice, the Court held that impermanent, tenure-based offices undermine security of tenure, motivation, judicial quality, efficiency, and consumer trust—necessitating a shift to permanency for qualitative, timely decisions. Exercising Article 142 powers, it advocated revamping consumer fora toward permanency at district, state, and national levels, aligning with precedents on judicial independence (Rojer Mathew, MBA – III, “MBA – IV”). Struck down unsustainable aspects of 2020 Rules; clarified Limaye – I requires no written examinations/viva voce for Presidents/Judicial Members of State Commissions or District Commission Presidents, but mandates them (in consultation with State Service Commissions) for Non-Judicial Members; restricted District Commission President qualifications to serving/retired District Judges; set aside Impugned Order I (qua 2019 Rules’ applicability for reappointments), upheld Impugned Order II, set aside Impugned Order III; allowed review petitions exempting judicial posts from examinations; mandated four-year tenures for continuing appointments (five-year for future ones); applied judgment prospectively except as directed. Directions: (i) Union of India to file affidavit within 3 months assessing constitutional viability of permanent Consumer Tribunal/Court with permanent staff/members/Presiding Officers, enhanced strength, infrastructure, and independence; (ii) Union to notify new Rules within 4 months incorporating five-year tenures, majority judicial selection committees, differentiated examination requirements, and restricted qualifications per precedents (Rojer Mathew, MBA – III, MBA – IV); (iii) States to complete fresh recruitments within 4 months of notification. Granted interim protections (under Article 142) to seven categories of Presidents/Members, with continuing appointments limited to four-year tenures: (1) Maharashtra appointees (05-10-2023, post-examination) to complete tenures or continue until new process completion; (2) Maharashtra terminated members (06-10-2023) eligible for reappointment consideration under new Rules (judicial posts exempt from examination; non-judicial required); (3) Pre-Limaye – I (pre-2023) serving Presidents/Members to complete tenures or continue until new process; (4) Other States’ serving/appointed Presidents/Judicial Members (with/without examinations) to complete tenures; stay-delayed selectees to be appointed for full terms; (5) Pre-Limaye – I non-judicial selectees (without examinations): serving to complete tenures; post-Limaye – I to continue until new process (no appointment if only selected); (6) Post-examination non-judicial selectees: serving to complete tenures; stay-delayed to be appointed for full terms; (7) Other States’ terminated members eligible for reappointment under new Rules (judicial exempt from examination; non-judicial required). Ganeshkumar Rajeshwarrao Selukar v. Mahendra Bhaskar Limaye, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2025 INSC 752 : (2025) 8 SCC 634

 

Departmental Enquiry – Natural Justice – Non-examination of Complainant – Perverse Findings – Where the Enquiry Officer relied upon a written complaint of bribery without examining the complainant and the other witnesses did not support the charge, such findings are perverse and cannot sustain a dismissal order – Held, the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) was justified in setting aside the penalty – the High Court erred in interfering with such findings – Non-examination of a material witness whose statement formed the foundation of the charge and was never subjected to cross-examination vitiates the enquiry for denial of fair hearing – Noted that While the High Court held that judicial review could not be exercised over findings of fact, the Supreme Court clarified that when findings are based on “completely misleading material” or are perverse, interference is justified – Judicial review is permissible where the conclusion of guilt is unsupported by evidence or based on no evidence – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723; Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10; Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364; Paras 17-19] V.M. Saudagar v. Central Railway, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1029 : 2025 INSC 1257

 

Deputation and Pension – Right to Absorption – Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules – West Bengal Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules – No right to absorption in borrowed department – Service rendered by a state government employee on a deputation basis in a central government’s department would not entitle him to pension as per Central Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1972 – Appeal Allowed. Union of India v. Phani Bhusan Kundu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 65

 

Directions in Exercise of Complete Justice – Held, the appellants were out of employment for almost 17 years and had worked for eight years, the Court issued specific directions, making it clear that they were in the peculiar circumstances of the case and shall not be a precedent – Directed – i. To be accommodated in existing Class IV vacancies in the District Judgeship of Ambedkar Nagar – If no vacancies exist, they shall be appointed in a supernumerary post, to be adjusted against future vacancies or cease on retirement, whichever is earlier; ii. Appellants who have crossed the age of superannuation: To be entitled to minimum pension dehors (irrespective of) completing only 8 years in employment; iii. Appointed appellants: Shall be continued without any seniority but the prior service period shall be reckoned for determining pensionable service, and they shall be granted pension at the minimum; iv. Intervening period (17 years) shall not be treated as notional service or for computing pensionable service. [Paras 11] Sanjay Kumar Mishra v. District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar (UP), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1031

 

Disability Pension – Burden of Proof – Schizophrenia – Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) – Medical Board Opinion – Whether the Army bears the burden to prove that a disability arising during service is not service-related, and whether denial of disability pension without reasoned medical opinion is permissible. Held, under the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961, disability pension provisions must be interpreted liberally in favor of the personnel. The burden of proof lies with the Army to demonstrate that a disability arising during service is neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service. The Medical Board’s opinion, lacking reasons to classify schizophrenia as a constitutional (hereditary) disorder, was deemed arbitrary and insufficient. Since the appellant was medically fit at enrolment in 1988 and the onset of schizophrenia occurred during service, the authorities failed to discharge the burden of proving the illness was not service-related. Denial of disability pension based on an unreasoned Medical Board opinion is impermissible, as reasons are statutorily required to justify discharge and denial of pension benefits. Where the authority initiates discharge due to a medical condition (not at the personnel’s request), the onus to substantiate the grounds for denying disability pension lies heavily on the authority. Appeal allowed; disability pension granted to the appellant. (Para 32 – 36) Rajumon T.M. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 546 : 2025 INSC 644 : AIR 2025 SC 2804

 

Disciplinary Action – Fake Transfer Order – Non-Supply of Preliminary Inquiry Report – Natural Justice – Prejudice Requirement – Clarity of Chargesheet – Whether disciplinary action can be challenged for non-supply of a preliminary inquiry report on grounds of violating natural justice without proving grave prejudice. The appellant, a Hindi-trained graduate teacher at Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, was dismissed for securing a transfer from Bangalore to Mumbai using a fake transfer order dated 01.10.1991. Her challenges before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay High Court, and Supreme Court were dismissed, upholding the disciplinary action. Held, Disciplinary proceedings cannot be set aside for non-supply of documents, such as a preliminary inquiry report, unless the delinquent employee demonstrates grave prejudice. Mere technical violations do not breach natural justice principles. The chargesheet clearly alleged the appellant’s use of a fake transfer order, enabling effective defense. The Court reaffirmed three natural justice principles: (i) Audi Alteram Partem (right to a fair hearing), (ii) Nemo Judex in Causa Sua (no bias), and (iii) reasoned decisions (speaking orders). Non-supply of documents violates these principles only if it causes grave prejudice. The appellant, who participated in a regular departmental inquiry with evidence from both sides, failed to show prejudice from non-supply of the preliminary inquiry report or other documents. The 9-year inquiry duration, spanning multiple locations, was justified, with no evidence of prejudice or tampering, and the appellant received subsistence allowances. The transfer order was proven fake, with the appellant as the sole beneficiary. The disciplinary authority followed due process, sharing reasons for disagreeing with the inquiry officer and seeking the appellant’s response. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the dismissal order, as no violation of natural justice was established. [Referred: Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727, Paras 18–26] S. Janaki Iyer v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 655 : 2025 INSC 742 : (2025) 8 SCC 696

 

Disciplinary Action – Moral Turpitude – Dismissal from Service – Proportionality of Punishment – Doctrine of Proportionality – This doctrine forbids the competent authority to act arbitrarily, vengefully or so harshly that the punishment awarded to a delinquent employee pricks the conscience of the court. Held, Respondent-Constable was a member of a disciplined Para Military Force and was posted in sensitive border area. He was obligated to perform his duties and guard the cash boxes with utmost dedication, honesty, commitment and discipline. Contrary to the faith and trust reposed in him by his superiors, he broke open the cash box. On being found guilty of gross misconduct involving moral turpitude, relying on confessional statement and evidences, it is duty of Disciplinary authority to impose a punishment on Respondent. This duty increases especially in Para military forces. All the members of the force must note that there is zero tolerance for such brazen misconduct, where the guardian of the cash box became its looter. The genuineness of the respondent’s confession has not been doubted by the High Court. High Court ought not to have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction to compel the authorities to impose a punishment less than dismissal from service. Misconduct proved against respondent is so grave and alarming that any punishment less than dismissal from service would prove inadequate and insufficient. High Court ought not to have applied doctrine of proportionality herein. Appeal allowed. (Paras 10, 11) Union of India v. No. 900224364 Const/G.D. Jageshwar Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 668

 

Disciplinary Proceedings – Acquittal in Criminal Case – Disciplinary action cannot be sustained when an employee is acquitted in a criminal case involving substantially similar charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances, as upholding such findings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. The Court awarded Rs. 30 lakhs compensation and Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant, a constable wrongfully dismissed from Bihar Police Service, due to procedural illegalities, including withheld departmental records, vague charges, and denial of cross-examination rights, rendering the dismissal violative of fairness and natural justice. (Paras 37, 40, 44, 47, 50 & 52) Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : 2025 INSC 554

 

Disciplinary Proceedings – Extension of Time – Due Process and Natural Justice – Disciplinary proceedings extending beyond a court or tribunal’s stipulated time limit without a genuine attempt to seek an extension are unlawful. If a time limit is conditioned with lapse of proceedings upon default, the disciplinary authority loses jurisdiction. Extensions may be sought in exceptional circumstances, but continuing proceedings without an extension, particularly despite objections, risks bias and violates due process. Non-compliance with judicial orders undermines the rule of law. In a case involving an Assistant Engineer accused of embezzling Rs. 2.5 crore, the Court identified multiple breaches of natural justice, including failure to provide enquiry documents and non-adherence to the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999. The enquiry was declared wholly vitiated, and the Court dismissed the appeal, awarding the respondent full retiral benefits, adjusted for provisional pension arrears. (Paras 10, 38, 60, 62, 63, 70) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 463 : 2025 INSC 555

 

Disciplinary Proceedings – The appellant, a Senior Medical Officer with 34 years of unblemished service, was served a charge-sheet 11 days before his retirement on March 31, 2017, alleging misconduct, including non-compliance with Election Commission directives, unauthorized leave, and failure to participate in the pulse polio program. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated, and the appellant was denied an extension of service. An inquiry officer was appointed a year later, and the appellant was found guilty of most charges, leading to a 2% permanent pension cut. The High Court modified the penalty to a 2% pension cut for 5 years, but the appellant challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. Whether the disciplinary proceedings and the penalty imposed were justified. Whether the High Court’s modification of the penalty was adequate. Whether the appellant’s procedural rights were violated during the inquiry. Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and the disciplinary authority’s penalty, holding that the charges were not substantiated by legal evidence. The Court found that the inquiry officer’s findings were based on perceived moral duties rather than the actual charges, and the disciplinary authority failed to provide a fair hearing. The appellant was exonerated of all charges, and the Court directed the restoration of his full pension, along with repayment of deducted amounts with 6% interest. The Court also awarded costs of ₹50,000 to the appellant, citing mala fide intent by the respondents in initiating disciplinary proceedings as retaliation for the appellant’s prior litigation against high-ranking officials. The Court emphasized that disciplinary actions must be based on legal evidence and procedural fairness, and penalties must be proportionate to the misconduct. The Court deprecated the misuse of disciplinary proceedings to target employees, especially those nearing retirement, for personal vendettas. The Election Commission’s policy exempting employees nearing retirement from election duty was highlighted, and the Court found the disciplinary action contrary to this policy. The appellant’s full pension was restored, and deducted amounts were ordered to be repaid with interest. Costs of ₹50,000 were awarded to the appellant, with liberty for the State to recover the amount from responsible officials. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing all penalties and restoring the appellant’s pension, while condemning the misuse of disciplinary proceedings for personal vendettas. Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2025 SC 620 : 2025 INSC 83

 

Disciplinary Proceedings – The respondent, a former branch manager of Syndicate Bank, was accused of financial irregularities, including fictitious debits, fraudulent withdrawals, and misappropriation of funds during his tenure at the Mudigubba branch (2007-2008). A disciplinary inquiry found the charges proven, leading to his dismissal in 2012. The respondent was acquitted in criminal proceedings but failed to overturn the dismissal in subsequent appeals. The High Court set aside the dismissal, citing lack of evidence and procedural unfairness, and ordered reinstatement with full benefits. Whether the disciplinary inquiry was conducted fairly and based on sufficient evidence. Whether the High Court erred in interfering with the disciplinary authority’s decision. Whether the penalty of dismissal was proportionate to the misconduct. Held, the disciplinary inquiry was fair, principles of natural justice were followed, and the findings were based on substantial evidence, including the respondent’s admissions and documentary proof. The Court reiterated that acquittal in criminal proceedings does not exonerate an employee in disciplinary proceedings, as the standards of proof differ. However, considering the respondent’s long unblemished service (21 years), the pressure of work, and the reimbursement of the financial loss, the penalty of dismissal was deemed disproportionate. The Court modified the penalty to a reduction in the time scale of pay for one year, without cumulative effect or adverse impact on pension. The appeal was partly allowed. The findings of misconduct were upheld, but the penalty was reduced to a minor penalty under Regulation 4(e) of the Syndicate Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. The respondent was entitled to retiral benefits, to be paid within four months. The judgment reaffirms the high standards of integrity expected from bank officers and the limited scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters. It underscores the principle of proportionality in imposing penalties, especially in cases involving long-standing employees with otherwise clean records. Syndicate Bank v. B.S.N. Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 92 : 2025 INSC 89 : (2025) 3 SCC 601

 

Education – Role of Teachers – The Court highlighted the pivotal role of teachers in shaping the future of the nation, especially in primary and upper primary education. Teachers are instrumental in moulding young minds, instilling values, and preparing students to be responsible citizens. The Court emphasized the need for teachers to adapt to modern challenges, including the use of technology and artificial intelligence, while guiding students to discern right from wrong. Parimal Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 142 : 2025 INSC 134

 

Education – Technical Education – AICTE Notifications – Qualifications for Teachers – PhD Requirement – Entitlement to Revised Pay Scales and Redesignation under 6th Pay Commission – Held, Assistant Professors in Engineering institutes (appointed after March 15, 2000), who did not have PhD qualification at the time of appointment or failed to acquire PhD within seven years of their appointment, cannot claim re-designation as Associate Professors in terms of the 2010 notification issued by the All-India Council for Technical Education (AICTE). At the same time, teachers who were appointed in various Engineering institutes prior to March 15, 2000, when PhD was not an essential requirement for the post of Assistant Professor, will receive the benefit and redesignation to the post of Associate Professor as per 6th Pay Commission. (Para 17 & 27) Secretary All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2025 INSC 422 : (2025) 6 SCC 605

 

Education – West Bengal Primary School Teachers Recruitment Rules, 2016 – Eligibility cut-off for D.El.Ed candidates of the 2020-22 batch applying for Assistant Teacher posts in West Bengal is the date of the recruitment notification (21.10.2022), not the earlier announcement (29.09.2022), as no cut-off was specified in the Rules, 2016. Eligibility is determined by the date in the advertisement inviting applications when rules lack a cut-off. The Court upheld the 21.10.2022 notification, allowing candidates who received certificates on 29.11.2022 to participate, and directed the recruitment process to proceed expeditiously under Article 142. [Paras 24, 30 – 33] Soumen Paul v. Shrabani Nayek, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 444 : 2025 INSC 451

Equal Pay for Equal Work – Contractual v. Regular/Ad Hoc Employees – Supreme Court examined the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ and is applicable to contractually appointed Assistant Professors – Contractual Assistant Professors were appointed through a rigorous public selection process and performed duties identical to those of their regular and ad hoc counterparts – Held, the State did not dispute that these professors performed the same functions – The principle that temporary employees are entitled to the minimum of the pay scale as long as they remain in service – Directed that the contractual professors be paid the minimum pay scale of an Assistant Professor and that arrears calculated at 8% should be paid from 3 years preceding the date of Writ petition were filed – Supreme Court expressed concern about low salaries of Rs. 30,000 p.m. paid to some contractual Assistant Professor for nearly two decades, noting that their regular counterparts earned significantly more – Suggested that the State should rationalize the pay structure based on the functions performed – Appeals allowed. [Paras 18-20, 22, 29, 31-33] Shah Samir Bharatbhai v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 827 : 2025 INSC 1026

 

Equivalence of Qualifications – Judicial Interference – Where the appointing authority, after obtaining necessary clarification, accepts the equivalence of a candidate’s qualification (Diploma in Electrical and Electronics Engineering) with the prescribed qualification (Diploma in Electrical Engineering) for recruitment to the post of Junior Engineer, and no glaring disparity exists between the two, Courts should refrain from interfering by setting aside the appointment on grounds of mere difference in nomenclature. The burden lies on the challenger to demonstrate arbitrariness or illegality in such acceptance, failing which judicial review is unwarranted, as equivalence is primarily a matter for the recruiting authority to determine. [Para 17 – 23] Sajid Khan v. L. Rahmathullah, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 237 : 2025 INSC 251 : AIR 2025 SC 1300

 

Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966 (Rules of 1966) – Rule 2(g) – State Forest Service – Forest Range Officer (FRO) – Supreme Court examined the definition of ‘State Forest Service’ under Rule 2(g) of Rules of 1966 and declared that ‘any service in a State, being a service connected with forestry and the members thereof having gazetted status’, constitutes the ‘State Forest Service’ subject to the approval of Central Government in consultation with State Government – Held, approval of Central Government is required for the entire service, not for individual posts within it – The post of FRO is part of the State forest Service and that its members are eligible for promotion to the Indian Forest Service (IFoS), provided the service is approved by Central Government – Appellant, a FRO, succeeded on the legal issue, the Court granted limited relief and held that appellant’s delay in raising his grievance meant he could not be granted relief for past promotion cycles and that appellant could not be considered ahead of his senior – Respondents must treat the Andhra Pradesh Forest Service, including FROs as the State Forest Service and consider them eligible for promotion – Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 6-11] P. Maruthi Prasada Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2025 INSC 1019

 

Forest Service – Performance Appraisal Reports (PARs) – Authority to Act as Reporting, Reviewing, or Accepting Authorities for Indian Forest Service (IFS) Officers up to Additional Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (APCCF): Held, reporting, reviewing, and accepting authorities for IFS officers up to APCCF must be their immediate superiors within the Forest Department, as mandated by Supreme Court rulings in State of Haryana v. P.C. Wadhwa (1987) and Santosh Bharti v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2007). For the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (PCCF), the reporting authority may be from another department, provided they are higher in rank and familiar with the PCCF’s work. The Supreme Court quashed the Government Order (G.O.) dated June 29, 2024, permitting Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers, such as District Collectors and Divisional Commissioners, to comment on PARs of IFS officers up to APCCF, as it violated prior Court directions in Santosh Bharti (September 22, 2000) and TN Godavarman Thirumalpad (April 19, 2004). Noting Madhya Pradesh as the only state adopting this practice, the Court deemed it contemptuous but refrained from further action. The Ministry of Environment and Forests had directed that PARs of IFS officers up to APCCF be evaluated by superior Forest Department officers. IAS officers may provide comments on IFS officers’ developmental work on a separate sheet, subject to review by a superior IFS officer. The State of Madhya Pradesh was directed to amend its rules to comply with prior Court orders. The ruling upholds the autonomy of the IFS in performance appraisals up to APCCF, restricting evaluations to Forest Department officers, except for the PCCF. (Para 37) In Re Performance Appraisal Reports of the Officers of the Indian Forest Service, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 605 : 2025 INSC 748

 

Frivolous Litigation – The petitioner, a former employee of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL), was dismissed in 2000 for habitual absenteeism and misconduct. Despite multiple judicial and administrative forums upholding his dismissal, the petitioner engaged in persistent and frivolous litigation, including filing multiple review petitions, appeals, and complaints alleging corruption against judges. The Court condemned the petitioner’s abuse of the judicial process, emphasizing that such conduct wastes valuable judicial time and resources. The Court imposed a cost of ₹1,00,000 on the petitioner, to be deposited with the State Legal Services Authority, as a deterrent against unscrupulous litigants. The SLP and the application for condonation of delay were dismissed, and the Court underscored the need to curb frivolous litigation to ensure timely justice for genuine cases. Pandurang Vithal Kevne v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2024 INSC 1051

 

Government Service – Sikkim Government Services (Leave) Rules, 1982; Rule 36 r/w. 32 – A government servant re-employed after retirement is not entitled to additional leave encashment under Rule 36 of the Rules if they already availed the maximum 300 days of leave encashment upon initial retirement. Rule 36 applies only to employees retiring at the age of superannuation (58 years) and does not extend to re-employed individuals. Rule 32, which governs re-employed servants, operates independently and does not entitle them to fresh leave encashment. Leave encashment, rooted in principles of equity and deferred compensation, must balance employee welfare with the financial stability of the employer, particularly when public funds are involved. Allowing multiple encashments for the same leave accrual risks unjust enrichment and burdens the public exchequer. The Court set aside the High Court’s decision, upheld the State’s clarificatory Office Memorandum, and rejected claims of procedural unfairness, finding no violation of natural justice. (Paras 14, 16, 21- 33) State of Sikkim v. Dr. Mool Raj Kotwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 472 : 2025 INSC 559 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1770

 

Gramin Dak Sevak (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011 – Misappropriation of Public Funds – Judicial Review of Disciplinary Authority’s Decision – Held, the High Court misdirected itself and travelled beyond the scope of jurisdiction exercisable in a matter of judicial review – Judicial review only permits scrutiny of the process of inquiry and not the case on merits, especially when no defect in the inquiry process was pointed out – The High Court erred by going into the merits of the controversy, examining the admission of guilt by the respondent, and setting aside the punishment – The Court noted that the documents clearly established the factum of embezzlement, evidenced by the passbooks being stamped with receipt of the amount but having no corresponding entries in the post office’s books of accounts – Mere deposit of the embezzled amount subsequent to being caught will not absolve an employee of the misconduct – The respondent’s explanation of having stamped the passbooks due to “ignorance of the Rules” after 12 years of service was rejected as “farfetched” and unacceptable – Supreme Court set aside the reinstatement of the Post Master who was removed from the service for embezzling the depositors amount for its personal use. The Court said mere deposit of the embezzled money will not absolve an employee of the misconduct – Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 – 11] Union of India v. Indraj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1104 : 2025 INSC 1313

 

Guidelines on seniority – Supreme Court issued certain guidelines for the filling up of the DJ posts invoking powers under Article 142 of the Constitution – i. The seniority of officers within the HJS shall be determined through an annual 4-point roster, filled by all officers appointed in the particular year in the repeating sequence of 2 Regular Promotees, 1 LDCE, and 1 DR; ii. Only if the recruitment process is completed within the year after which it was initiated and no other appointments, from any of the three sources, have already taken place in respect of the recruitment initiated for that subsequent year, shall the officers belatedly so appointed be entitled to seniority as per the roster of the year in which recruitment was initiated; iii. If the recruitment process is not initiated for vacancies arising in a given year in the same year, the candidate filling such vacancy, in subsequent recruitment, shall be granted seniority within the annual roster of the year in which the recruitment process is finally concluded and appointment is made; iv. After the recruitment of DRs and LDCEs is complete for a particular year, the positions falling in their quota that remain unfilled due to lack of suitable candidates shall be filled through RPs, subject to such RPs being placed only on subsequent RP positions in the annual roster; and the vacancies in the subsequent year shall be computed so as to apply the proportion of 50:25:25 to the entire cadre; v. The statutory rules governing the HJS in the respective States, in consultation with the High Courts, shall prescribe the exact modalities of the Annual Roster and how the directions of this judgement shall be implemented – Clarified that these guidelines are not intended to resolve any inter-se dispute – The guidelines are general and mandatory to be incorporated into the regulations governing inter-se seniority of higher judicial services – The guidelines will not reopen any decided issues related to inter-se seniority disputes. [Paras 97-100] All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1119 : 2025 INSC 1328

 

Higher Judicial Services (HJS) – Inter Se Seniority – Direct Recruits (DR) – Regular Promotees (RP) – LDCE Promotees (LDCE) – Held, previous service in the lower rungs of the judiciary (Junior Division/Senior Division) cannot be reckoned for granting weightage, preferential treatment, or a separate quota for determining inter se seniority, fixation in higher grades (Selection Grade/Super Time Scale), or assignment of administrative duties within the common cadre of the HJS – Once appointed to the common cadre of the Higher Judicial Service, all members lose the ‘birthmark’ of the source from which they were recruited (RP, LDCE, or DR), and the service rendered in the feeder category pales into insignificance – The theory of classifying District Judges within the HJS based on their length of service in the lower rungs subverts the guarantee of equality available to members of the common cadre – Further advancement within the HJS, including promotion to higher grades, must be based on merit-cum-seniority, evaluated on the basis of performance and service rendered within the HJS cadre and not the lower feeder cadre – Supreme Court ruled out any special quota/weightage for promotee judges in the posts of District Judges, observing that there is no nationwide pattern of disproportionate representation of direct recruits in the Higher Judicial Service. [Relied on State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Sh. Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors. (1974) 1 SCC 19; Paras 54-65, 94] All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1119 : 2025 INSC 1328

 

IAS (Pay) Rules, 2016; Rule 2 – Contention that no benchmark score was fixed under Rule 2 is inconsequential. Clause 7.2 of the Guidelines clearly states that no benchmark is required. Moreover, the absence of a fixed benchmark does not constitute arbitrariness or discrimination, as the appellant was considered a ‘special case’ despite 90% of his ACRs being unavailable. (Para 23) Raju Narayana Swamy v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 462 : 2025 INSC 563

 

IAS Officer – Individual excellence may foster a superiority complex, potentially undermining discipline, decorum, and collegiality. Given the critical need for collective leadership at the highest levels of civil service, the Committee was justified in prioritizing adherence to discipline and collegiality. (Para 22) Raju Narayana Swamy v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 462 : 2025 INSC 563

 

IAS Officer – Promotion to Chief Secretary Grade – Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) – Eligibility Criteria – Screening Committee – Dismissal of Plea – Officer failed to meet the mandatory requirement of having 90% of Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) completed, a key criterion for promotion eligibility. (Para 25) Raju Narayana Swamy v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 462 : 2025 INSC 563

 

Indirect Discrimination – Despite qualifying preliminary, mains, and interview stages of Jharkhand Combined Civil Services Competitive Examination, appellant was disqualified for non-appearance in the medical examination prescribed post-interview – Held, strict adherence to procedural instructions is generally required but found that no penalty for non-appearance at medical exam was prescribed – Reiterated principle that procedure is handmaid of justice and cannot be used oppressively to defeat substantive rights, and exceptions to it, where non-compliance should not automatically result in dismissal unless specific conditions apply – Ambiguity in the press advertisement about the medical examination date created a genuine doubt for appellant’s non-appearance, which was not deliberate or mischievous – The appellant belonged to Scheduled Tribe, and indirect discrimination principles under equality jurisprudence were considered relevant – A one-time relaxation was directed by the Court to allow the appellant to appear for medical examination with creation of a supernumerary post and continuity of service benefits excluding back wages – The High Court order was set aside, allowing the appeal with directions for the medical examination to be conducted and appropriate appointment made. [Paras 6, 7, 10-21] Shreya Kumari Tirkey v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 937

 

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 17B – In cases of wrongful dismissal, lump sum compensation may be more appropriate than reinstatement with back wages in specific circumstances, provided courts balance the interests of the employee and employer with reasoned justification. Back wages are not automatic and depend on whether the dismissed employee was gainfully employed post-termination. The quantum of back wages is at the court’s discretion if the employee admits to or is proven to have had gainful employment, with the employer bearing the burden of proof under Section 17B. In this case, the employer was found guilty of suggestio falsi (false representation) and suppresio veri (suppression of truth) before the Labour Court and Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, violating natural justice principles. The employee, a driver dismissed after a vehicular accident, was awarded 75% back wages from termination to superannuation, along with full terminal benefits, modifying the High Court’s order for 100% back wages. (Para 25, 30, 34, 44, 45) Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahadeo Krishna Naik, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 212 : 2025 INSC 218 : [2025] 3 SCR 100 : AIR 2025 SC 1172 : (2025) 4 SCC 321

 

Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 – Maternity leave is an integral component of maternity benefits, forming part of reproductive rights recognized under international human rights law, encompassing the rights to health, privacy, equality, non-discrimination, and dignity. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench’s order denying maternity leave to a government teacher for her third child, citing the State’s two-child norm policy. The appellant, who had two children from a prior marriage (not in her custody) and sought leave for her first child born during employment, was entitled to maternity benefits under the Act. The Act prevails over conflicting State service rules by virtue of Article 254 of the Constitution. The Act’s provisions on maternity leave duration (26 weeks for women with fewer than two surviving children, 12 weeks for those with two or more) do not limit benefits based on the total number of children, and “surviving children” refers to those in the custody of the woman employee. The State’s two-child norm must be harmonized with the objectives of maternity benefits through purposive interpretation. The impugned order was set aside, restoring the Single Judge’s direction to grant maternity leave from 11 October 2021 to 10 October 2022. (Paras 28, 32, 34, 35) K. Umadevi v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 614 : 2025 INSC 781 : AIR 2025 SC 2719 : (2025) 8 SCC 263

 

Migration of reserved category candidates to unreserved category – Relaxations availed – Held, Office memorandum, which disallows migration for candidates who avail of ‘relaxed standards’ like age and experience, does not apply to relaxations in physical standards such as height, weight and chest – Supreme Court drew a distinction between relaxations in age, experience, and written examination standards and variations in physical measurements – Different physical standards for genders, castes or geographical locations are not ‘relaxations’ in same sense as age or experience concessions – They are distinct parameters for different categories of candidates – Availing physical relaxation doesn’t bar reserved candidate from general category selection if rules don’t forbid. [Paras 9-12] Uma Shankar Gurjar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 886 : 2025 INSC 1083

 

Out of 51 sanctioned lecturer posts at Motilal Nehru Government Polytechnic College, Puducherry, 45 were filled on an ad hoc basis, despite the introduction of recruitment rules in 2006 – Respondent Nos.1-3 were appointed ad hoc in 2005 and sought regularization with back benefits. The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Madras Bench, and Madras High Court granted relief, citing parity with 15 similarly situated lecturers who had obtained prior CAT orders (upheld by the High Court and Supreme Court in 2007) for regularization – The Union of India (UoI) and Directorate of Technical Education, Puducherry, appealed, citing UPSC’s refusal to regularize “illegal” appointees. No recruitment process was initiated post-2006 rules, despite the lecturers’ unblemished service and qualifications – In 2007, the Supreme Court had directed a scheme for regularizing casual lecturers, but compliance lapsed, with UPSC obstructing the 15 prior cases despite past regularizations in other Puducherry institutions. Issues 1. Whether ad hoc lecturers, appointed pre-2006 rules and serving without blemish, are entitled to regularization despite UPSC’s objection to “illegal” appointments. 2. Validity of prolonged ad hoc engagements without legitimate recruitment, in defiance of court orders and statutory rules. 3. Accountability for systemic non-compliance and illegal appointments in public employment. Held, Regularization Ordered: Invoking extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to secure “complete justice,” the Court directed the Government of Puducherry to regularize the services of all 18 lecturers (15 prior + 3 respondents) forthwith, without UPSC involvement. This overrides exploitative delays, as the lecturers possessed requisite qualifications and had served since 2005. Critique of Authorities: Described the situation as a “very sorry state of affairs.” Lamented UPSC’s “audacious” stance against a subsisting 2007 Supreme Court order and non-compliance by Puducherry authorities. Noted failure to initiate recruitment post-2006 rules, enabling prolonged ad hoc exploitation. Precedential Clarification: Reaffirmed State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1] does not shield employers from regularization where no recruitment process was undertaken despite opportunities, per Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, (2023) 9 SCC 172]. Public employment mandates selecting the “best available talent” via open advertisement; ad hoc arrangements post-rules are impermissible. Future Safeguards: Prohibited ad hoc appointments for the 6 vacant posts or future vacancies; all must follow 2006 Puducherry Recruitment Rules. Investigation Directed: Ordered a Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) probe into illegal appointments, fixing responsibility on culpable officials (serving or retired). CVC report due by 14 May 2025. Union of India v. K. Velajagan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 170

 

Parity in Service Conditions – Doctors (Allopathy vs. Indigenous Systems of Medicine) – Retirement Age and Pay Scales – Reference to Larger Bench – Parity in service conditions – The Supreme Court referred the issue of whether doctors practicing Allopathy and those practicing Indigenous Systems of Medicine (like Ayurveda, Homeopathy, Unani, etc.) can be treated equally for determining service conditions, specifically the retirement age and pay packages, to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement – The Court noted a divergence of opinion between its previous judgments regarding whether MBBS doctors and doctors practicing indigenous systems of medicine can be treated equally for service conditions – Held that the consideration for parity in service conditions should ideally be on the touchstone of identity of functions, similarity in work carried out, and comparable duties assigned. [Paras 4-6] State of Rajasthan v. Anisur Rahman, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1017

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Held, under Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Act, 1972, gratuity can be forfeited, wholly or partially, if an employee is terminated for misconduct constituting an offence involving moral turpitude, without requiring a criminal conviction. The observation in Union Bank of India v. C.G. Ajay Babu, (2018) 9 SCC 529, suggesting conviction as a prerequisite for forfeiture, was obiter dicta and not binding. The term “offence” under the Act, as per the General Clauses Act, refers to any act or omission punishable by law, judged on the standard of preponderance of probabilities in disciplinary proceedings, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal proceedings. The Disciplinary or Appointing Authority must determine if the misconduct constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude and decide the extent of forfeiture based on the misconduct’s gravity. In the present case, the Court upheld forfeiture for suppression of the actual date of birth and misappropriation of fares by MSRTC conductors, as these acts constituted offences involving moral turpitude, despite no criminal proceedings. Appeal allowed. (Para 10, 13) Western Coal Fields Ltd. v. Manohar Govinda Fulzele, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 216 : 2025 INSC 233

 

Payment of Gratuity – Applicability of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 4, Section 5 – Held, even in cases of resignation, an employee who has rendered continuous service for not less than five years is entitled to gratuity under Section 4(1)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – In the absence of a notification under Section 5 of the 1972 Act exempting the Corporation, the claim for gratuity cannot be denied – The legal heirs are entitled to receive gratuity for the service rendered along with 6% interest per annum from the date of resignation till payment – The respondent Corporation fairly conceded to the release of leave encashment benefits to the family members of the deceased employee – The legal heirs are entitled to receive the amount towards leave encashment. [Paras 10, 11] Ashok Kumar Dabas v. Delhi Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1186 : 2025 INSC 1404

 

Pay Scale – Employees appointed on a temporary basis against sanctioned posts are entitled to a regular pay scale after completing three years of service, as per the relevant government circular. The designation of employees as “part-time” does not negate their entitlement to a regular pay scale if they are appointed against sanctioned posts and fulfill the conditions of the applicable rules. The absence of a Screening Committee for scrutinizing eligibility does not justify denying benefits to employees who are otherwise similarly situated to those who have received such benefits. The appellants were granted the benefit of a regular pay scale, and the State was directed to pay arrears accordingly. Rakesh Kumar Charmakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2025 INSC 136 : (2025) 3 SCC 326

 

 

Pensionary Benefits – Regularization of Absence as Extraordinary Leave – Break in Service – Whether a retired government employee can be denied pensionary benefits on the ground of ‘break in service’ when their unauthorized absence was regularized as extraordinary leave. Held, pensionary benefits cannot be denied to a retired government employee whose unauthorized absence was regularized as extraordinary leave. Once the absence is treated as extraordinary leave, it cannot be considered a ‘break in service’ for denying pension. Denial of pensionary benefits must be supported by a departmental inquiry proving unauthorized absence, and the burden cannot shift to the employee to prove they were prevented from working. In the absence of such an inquiry, the regularization of service prevails, entitling the employee to pensionary benefits. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the decisions of the State Administrative Tribunal and High Court. The respondents were directed to finalize the appellant’s pension within three months. (Para 11, 12) Jaya Bhattacharya v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2025 INSC 270 : AIR 2025 SC 1575

 

Pension – Right to Property – Constitutional Protection – Court reiterated that pension is not a bounty but a valuable right to property, constitutionally protected under Article 300A – It can only be denied or reduced by clear prescription of law and with strict adherence to all procedural safeguards – Held – set aside order of High Court citing that High Court failed to read the regulation in its proper perspective and wrongly held that a compulsorily retired employee would not be entitled to any pension unless order is passed under Regulation 33(1) – Appellant was also not given opportunity of hearing prior to reducing his pension – Appeal allowed. [Para 17] Vijay Kumar v. Central Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 713 : 2025 INSC 848

 

Pensions – Odisha Pension Rules, 1992 – A batch of job contract employees in Odisha, initially engaged under job contract establishments and later regularised in pensionable posts, claimed pensionary benefits counting their entire pre-regularisation service. The Orissa Administrative Tribunal and Single Judge of the Orissa High Court upheld the claim, treating job contract service akin to work-charged service. The State’s writ appeals before the Division Bench were dismissed as time-barred due to inordinate delay. The State approached the Supreme Court via special leave petitions, many filed belatedly. Appeals allowed; costs imposed. (Para 3. 15, 20) State of Odisha v. Sudhansu Sekhar Jena, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 239 : 2025 INSC 259

 

Pensions – Odisha Pension Rules, 1992 – Rule 18(3), (6) – Distinction between work-charged employees and job contract employees – Entitlement to pension for pre-regularisation service – Job contract employees not entitled to count entire pre-regularisation service towards pension; only qualifying period to make eligible for pensionary benefits – Unlike work-charged employees, whose full service of 5 years or more counts if uninterrupted and followed by regular appointment – 2001 amendment to Rule 18(6) limits job contract service to minimum qualifying period post-regularisation – State’s delay in appeals condoned due to fiscal implications on exchequer and large number of affected employees, but costs of ₹1.5 lakhs per employee imposed on State for lethargic litigation approach – Orissa Administrative Tribunal and Orissa High Court orders set aside insofar as they allowed full pre-regularisation service for job contract employees. (Para 3. 15, 20) State of Odisha v. Sudhansu Sekhar Jena, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 239 : 2025 INSC 259

 

Pensions – Odisha Pension Rules, 1992 – Rule 18(3), (6) – Whether job contract employees, upon regularisation, are entitled under the Odisha Pension Rules, 1992, to pension benefits counting their full pre-regularisation service period, or only a limited qualifying portion thereof, as distinct from work-charged employees. Held: The Supreme Court, departing from the norm against condoning excessive delays, examined the merits given the matter’s impact on numerous employees and the State exchequer. It clarified the statutory distinction under Rule 18: sub-Rule (3) qualifies the full uninterrupted service of work-charged employees (5+ years) for pension upon regularisation, whereas sub-Rule (6) limits job contract employees to only that service portion necessary to achieve pension eligibility post-regularisation. The 2001 amendment reinforced this intent to curb undue fiscal burden. The Tribunal and High Court misinterpreted the rules by equating the two categories. Full pre-regularisation service for job contractors impermissibly expands eligibility beyond legislative scheme. Directions issued for State to deposit ₹1.5 lakhs per affected employee within 4 weeks, non-effective until compliance; dismissed delay-based petitions revived per merits. (Para 3. 15, 20) State of Odisha v. Sudhansu Sekhar Jena, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 239 : 2025 INSC 259

 

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (1995 Act) – Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (1947 Act) – Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) – High Court upheld termination of a driver found to be color blind, without offering alternate employment – Held, Respondent failed to make demonstrable efforts to identify or assess the feasibility of alternative employment, violating statutory obligations and administrative fairness – Clause 14 of Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) dt. 17.12.1979, executed under Section 12(3) of the 1947 Act, specifically provides for alternate employment to drivers declared color blind with pay protection and continuity of service – This clause remains valid & enforceable – The subsequent MOS dt. 22.12.1986, neither expressly overrides nor impliedly nullifies the 1979 settlement – Both settlements operate harmoniously, with the 1986 settlement being general and the 1979 settlement addressing a specific category of disability (color blindness) – A general provision does not override a specific provision – Failure to explore alternate employment before resorting to medical retirement is a substantive illegality that violates the appellant’s right to livelihood and equal treatment – This obligation is rooted in constitutional discipline and statutory expectation flowing from Article 14 & 21 – The burden lies on Respondent-Corporation to establish that no suitable alternate post was available – Directed Respondent-Corporation to appoint appellant to a suitable post – The obligation to reasonably accommodate such employees is not just a matter of administrative grace, but a constitutional and statutory imperative, rooted in the principles of non-discrimination, dignity, and equal treatment. Appeal allowed. [Paras 13, 14, 17, 21, 25-27, 33, 35, 37, 40] Ch. Joseph v. Telangana State Road Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 763 : 2025 INSC 920

 

Police Service – Constitution of India; Articles 14, 16, and 21 – Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) – Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Constitutional Validity of Retrospective Amendment – Whether the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955, granting seniority to in-service candidates over direct recruits based on prior service instead of competitive examination marks, violates Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution. Held, seniority in direct recruitment must be determined solely based on merit, i.e., marks obtained in the competitive examination, and not prior in-service experience. The retrospective application of the 2017 amendment, which favored less meritorious in-service candidates, was arbitrary and unconstitutional, violating Articles 14 (equality before law), 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment), and 21 (due process). The Supreme Court struck down the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) and directed the State to: (i) recast seniority lists for direct recruits from 1995 based exclusively on examination ranks within 60 days; (ii) ensure no reversion of existing promotions but halt further promotions until revised lists are issued; and (iii) grant notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages) to eligible direct recruits based on revised lists. (Para 22–27) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612

 

Police Service — Dismissal — Appointment based on Forged Degree/Certificate – The respondent, appointed as a Constable in Delhi Police in 1988, was dismissed from service in 1997 after a complaint in 1996 alleged his appointment was based on a forged and fabricated degree/certificate – The Central Administrative Tribunal (“CAT”) and the High Court of Delhi set aside the dismissal and remanded the matter for a full-fledged departmental inquiry – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the orders passed by the CAT and the High Court were unsustainable – Held, the act of getting an appointment in a uniformed service like the police, which is supposed to uphold the rule of law, on the basis of a forged degree/certificate is un-condonable – In the particular facts and circumstances of the case, where the forgery was established, the absence of a full departmental inquiry may not be a factor to vitiate the final order of dismissal from service – Appeal allowed. [Para 8] Commissioner of Police v. Ex. Ct. Vinod Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1117

 

Police Service – Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) – Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Directions – (i) Recast seniority lists for direct recruits (80% open market, 20% in-service) based solely on competitive examination marks within 60 days. (ii) No reversion of officers promoted under prior seniority lists, but no further promotions until revised lists are finalized. (iii) Grant promotions to eligible departmental candidates based on revised seniority lists within two months. (iv) Direct recruits found eligible in revised lists entitled to notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages). (v) Conduct a common competitive examination for 100% direct recruitment, with seniority determined strictly by examination marks/ranks. (Para 28) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612

 

Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 (Jharkhand) – Rule 4 (Eligibility) vs. Rule 21 (Merit List) – Calculation of Marks in Intermediate Examination – Exclusion of Vocational Subject Marks – Supreme Court set aside suspension of school teachers in Jharkhand, finding that they were declared ineligible based on a different charge, which was never labelled against them in the show cause notice – Held, Rule 21 A (ii) (A) of the 2012 Rules, which excludes marks obtained in the “additional subject” for the purpose of calculating the “educational merit point” for preparation of the “Merit List,” is not applicable for determining the “minimum qualification” or “eligibility” of a candidate – Rule 4, which deals with eligibility to appear in the Teacher Eligibility Test, does not provide for the exclusion of marks secured in the vocational subject – The method of calculation provided on the reverse side of the marksheet – which includes the bonus marks secured in the vocational subject (over and above the pass marks) to the aggregate to improve the result – must be followed for determining the minimum eligibility marks in the absence of a bar or an alternate method in the eligibility rule (Rule 4) – Department erred in applying Rule 21 for the purpose of deciding the eligibility criteria, an error also committed by the Division Bench of the High Court – Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench’s judgment, which upheld the termination of the appellants’ services (Intermediate Trained Teachers for Classes I-V) – The termination was based on two grounds: (i) invalid graduation certificates and (ii) securing less than the minimum qualifying marks (40% for Scheduled Tribe candidates) in the intermediate examination. [Paras 10 – 29] Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1009 : 2025 INSC 1212

 

Principles of Natural Justice – Termination of Service – The termination orders were vitiated for violation of the principles of natural justice – The termination orders were held to be violative of the principles of natural justice because the Department shifted the basis for termination to the exclusion of vocational marks after the appellants had successfully replied to the original charges in the show cause notice- This new reason, which was not alleged in the show cause notice, denied them a fair opportunity to defend themselves. [Relied on Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, V.P. & others, (2004) 4 SCC 281; Paras 30-36] Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1009 : 2025 INSC 1212

 

Prolonged suspension – Reinstatement – Subsistence Allowance – The applicant, an Assistant Superintendent (Jail), sought revocation of his suspension which was extended periodically. The suspension followed allegations of providing undue facilities to ex-promoters/directors of Unitech Ltd. who were under trial for financial misappropriation involving home buyers’ funds. The Supreme Court directed the suspension of 32 Tihar Jail officials, including the applicant, pending further proceedings. The applicant argued for reinstatement, citing the prolonged suspension and lack of progress in the criminal case. The Court recalled the suspension order, leaving it to the Competent Authority to decide on reinstatement based on whether it would impede the ongoing departmental proceedings. The Court noted that suspended officials are entitled to 75% of their pay as subsistence allowance after six months of suspension, unless denied for valid reasons. Bhupinder Singh v. Unitech Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 147

Promotion – Direct Recruitment – Procedure – Whether an employee is entitled to claim promotion to a post that is required to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment, and not through promotion from a feeder cadre? Whether a vacancy meant for direct recruitment can be filled merely by issuing an internal circular, without a public advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates? The importance of adhering to statutory rules and proper documentation in judicial proceedings to avoid miscarriage of justice. The petitioner, employed as a peon since 1978, sought promotion to the post of Tracer, claiming eligibility based on a 3-month training course. The Administrative Tribunal initially directed the State to consider her case for promotion. However, the High Court set aside the Tribunal’s order, holding that the post of Tracer was to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment as per the Orissa Subordinate Architectural Service Rules, 1979. The petitioner challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. Held, the post of Tracer, as per the 1979 Rules, is to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment and not through promotion. Rule 5(1)(e) of the 1979 Rules explicitly states that all posts of Tracers in Categories I, II, and III shall be filled by direct recruitment. The petitioner, being a peon, was not eligible for promotion to the post of Tracer, as it is not a promotional post under the Rules. The Court reiterated that direct recruitment to public posts must follow a transparent process, including public advertisements and competitive examinations, as mandated by Rule 7 of the 1979 Rules. The State’s failure to issue a public advertisement and follow the prescribed procedure rendered the appointments invalid. Jyostnamayee Mishra v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2025 INSC 87 : AIR 2025 SC 676

 

Promotion – Eligibility criteria – Medical Education Service – Post of Associate Professor – Distinction Between Administrative and Teaching Cadres – Whether the High Court of Kerala was justified in interfering with the promotion to the post of Associate Professor in the Department of Neurosurgery on the ground of lacking five years of physical teaching experience as an Assistant Professor after acquiring the M.Ch. degree. Whether Government Order (G.O.) dated April 7, 2008, or G.O. dated December 14, 2009, governed the eligibility criteria for promotion to the post of Associate Professor in the Medical Education Service. Whether the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules (KS & SSR), particularly Rule 10(ab), applied to the promotional appointment in question. Held, G.O. dated April 7, 2008, which governed the recruitment and promotion in the Medical Education Service, did not explicitly require five years of teaching experience after acquiring the M.Ch. degree for promotion to the post of Associate Professor. The absence of such a requirement in the Teaching Cadre (Branch-II) was deliberate, as it was explicitly mentioned in the Administrative Cadre (Branch-I). The Court applied the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing excludes the other) to conclude that the omission of the phrase “after acquiring postgraduate degree” in the Teaching Cadre was intentional. Rule 10(ab) of the KS & SSR, which generally requires experience to be gained after acquiring the basic qualification, was held inapplicable to the promotional appointment in question. The Court reasoned that G.O. dated April 7, 2008, being a special rule, superseded the general rules under the KS & SSR. The phrase “unless otherwise specified” in Rule 10(ab) allowed for exceptions, and the specific requirements of G.O. dated April 7, 2008, constituted such an exception. The High Court’s reliance on Rule 28(b)(1A) of the KS & SSR was also deemed erroneous, as it applied only when no qualified candidate was available for promotion, which was not the case here. The requirement of post-qualification experience was more relevant for administrative posts (Branch-I) than for teaching posts (Branch-II), where the emphasis was on overall teaching experience. Dr. Sharmad v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2025 INSC 70

 

Promotion to the post of District Judge – Merit-cum-Seniority – Suitability Test – Seniority – Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal challenging the denial of promotion to the appellants, who were judicial officers in Jharkhand, despite qualifying the suitability test for promotion to the post of District Judge in the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service. The appellants were denied promotion on the basis of a merit list, although they had secured more than the requisite minimum marks for suitability. The Court relied on the judgment in Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta v. High Court of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 387, holding that under the 65% quota for promotion based on merit-cum-seniority, once a candidate qualifies the suitability test, promotions cannot be denied solely on the basis of a comparative merit list. The suitability of each candidate should be assessed individually, and a comparative assessment is not warranted unless explicitly provided by the applicable rules. Under the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services (Recruitment, Appointment, and Condition of Service) Rules, 2001, promotions under the 65% merit-cum-seniority quota should be based on suitability, not comparative merit. Once candidates qualify the suitability test, they are entitled to promotion without a comparative merit list ranking. The appellants were granted notional promotion from the date on which other officers from the same selection list were promoted (i.e., as per the notification dated 30.05.2019). They were also entitled to all consequential service benefits, including seniority, increments, and notional pay fixation, but without any back wages. Appeal Allowed. Dharmendra Kumar Singh v. Honble High Court of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2025 INSC 72 : AIR 2025 SC 465 : (2025) 6 SCC 460

 

Public Employment – Cancellation of Select List – Judicial Review – Courts should scrutinize whether the decision to cancel a selection process is wholly disproportionate to the risk and overly severe. When systemic fraud or irregularities vitiate a recruitment process, the entire process becomes illegitimate. If 2 wrongdoers can be segregated, innocent candidates should not be penalized by the cancellation of the entire process. In cases involving larger public interest, additional grounds can be considered to examine the validity of an order. The court can review the original reasons that caused the cancellation of the select list. (Para 50 & 51) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

 

Public Employment – Cancellation of Select List – Judicial Review – Each case regarding the cancellation of a select list must be decided on its own facts. The court must determine if the recruiting authority’s decision to cancel the entire process, rather than save a part of it, is disproportionate and irrational. If the selection process borders on fraud, such as through violations of reservation policies, the decision to cancel the entire process can be justified. (Para 50 & 51) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

 

Public Employment – Cancellation of Select List – Rights of Empanelled Candidates – Empanelment does not grant an indefeasible right to appointment, but empanelled candidates have a right to challenge adverse decisions. The appointing authority cannot ignore the select panel arbitrarily; there must be cogent reasons for not making appointments. Policy decisions not to carry forward the selection process must be bona fide, justifiable, and free from arbitrariness. (Para 53) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

 

Public Employment – Interview-Based Selection – Presumption of Favouritism – Arbitrariness and Judicial Review – When a government itself acknowledges that a selection process based solely on interviews carries an inherent risk of arbitrariness and potential for misuse, this perception is a significant factor in judicial review. An assessment of candidates based solely on interview marks can reasonably lead to a presumption of favouritism. In such circumstances, courts should exercise significant restraint in substituting their judgment for the government’s decision, especially when the government has acted to rectify a selection process perceived as flawed. (Para 40) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

 

Public Employment – Recruitment Process – Cancellation of Select List by Successor Government – Judicial Review – Proportionality Test – Scope of Interference – Where a successor government cancels a select list prepared by a previous government due to detected illegalities and irregularities, the judicial review court must apply the proportionality test to assess whether the cancellation was justified. The court should consider whether the government’s decision was so disproportionate and incommensurate with the detected illegalities/irregularities as to warrant interference. The court should not substitute its own view for that of the government, especially when the government’s decision is not unreasonable or implausible. The government’s decision to ensure diversity, inclusivity, and fairness in public service, even if it entails canceling a tainted selection process, should be given due deference. (Para 52) Public Employment – Absence of Challenge by Unsuccessful Candidates – The absence of a challenge from unsuccessful candidates does not preclude the government from addressing perceived arbitrariness or potential for favouritism in a selection process. (Para 40) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

 

Recruitment for post of Principal – Determination of eligibility and experience cut-off date – Effect of deferred advertisement – Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and restored the Central Administrative Tribunal’s (CAT) order, holding that candidates who acquired the requisite 10 years of teaching experience by the extended closing date of a re-notified advertisement are eligible – Observed that since the initial indicative advertisement was deactivated immediately due to COVID-19 and the selection process had never effectively commenced, the eligibility must be determined as per the subsequent detailed advertisement. [Paras 11] Kailash Prasad v. Union Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1168

 

Recruitment Process – Constable positions in the Assam Forest Protection Force (AFPF) – Political Change and Cancellation- The appellants are granted liberty to take forward the process of filling up 104 Constables in the AFPF, in accordance with law, by publishing fresh advertisement. The respondents, if they choose to apply in pursuance of such advertisement, shall be considered for appointment waiving their age bar as well as waiving insignificant minor deficiencies in physical measurement as well as insignificant requirements of the PET. It would be desirable if rules are framed for the purpose of recruitment and such rules are uniformly applied to all and sundry, so as to preempt any allegation of bias or arbitrariness. (Para 63 & 64) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

 

Recruitment – Qualification – Teacher Eligibility Test – Whether the High Court erred in permitting candidates with Central Teacher Eligibility Test (CTET) or State Teacher Eligibility Test (STET) qualifications to participate in the recruitment process for Assistant Teachers in Jharkhand, despite the Jharkhand Teacher Eligibility Test (JTET) being the prescribed eligibility criterion under the 2022 Recruitment Rules and Advertisement No. 13/2023? Whether the State of Jharkhand acted arbitrarily by altering the eligibility criteria mid-way through the recruitment process, in violation of the principles laid down in Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 864 ? Whether the State Government has the authority to relax the minimum qualifications for teacher recruitment under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) Guidelines, 2011 ? Held, the Jharkhand High Court erred in permitting CTET and STET qualified candidates to participate in the ongoing recruitment process for Assistant Teachers in Jharkhand. The Court emphasized that the eligibility criteria, as per the 2022 Recruitment Rules and Advertisement No. 13/2023, required candidates to pass the JTET, and this criterion could not be altered mid-way through the recruitment process. The Court reiterated the principle laid down in Tej Prakash Pathak that the eligibility criteria for recruitment cannot be changed after the recruitment process has commenced, as it would violate the guarantee of equal opportunity under Article 16 of the Constitution. The State’s decision to relax the eligibility criteria based on the Advocate General’s concession was deemed arbitrary and unfair. The State Government does not have the authority to relax the minimum qualifications for teacher recruitment under the RTE Act and NCTE Guidelines unless the Central Government issues a notification under Section 23(2) of the RTE Act. The State’s actions in this case were not in compliance with the statutory framework. The impugned judgment of the High Court permitting CTET and STET holders to participate in the recruitment process was set aside. Only JTET holders who possessed the requisite qualifications under the 2022 Recruitment Rules prior to the 2024 amendment were declared eligible for appointment. CTET and STET holders who applied after the High Court’s judgment or the amendment in the rules were deemed ineligible for recruitment under Advertisement No. 13/2023. The appeals were allowed, and the recruitment process was directed to proceed strictly in accordance with the 2022 Recruitment Rules and Advertisement No. 13/2023, without any mid-way alterations to the eligibility criteria. Parimal Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 142 : 2025 INSC 134

 

Recruitment – Wait List/Reserved Panel – Right to Appointment – Binding Nature of Concession on Law – Held, a candidate on a wait list/reserved panel has no vested right to be appointed – The right to be considered arises only if a selected candidate does not join, and the wait list operates for a limited period, not indefinitely, and certainly not after a fresh recruitment process has commenced – Since all selected candidates had joined, the respondent’s right as a waitlisted candidate was extinguished – The statement/concession made by the appellants’ counsel in 1999 that the respondent would be considered for a future vacancy in the SC quota cannot bind the appellants as it runs contrary to the statutory Recruitment Rules – Giving effect to such a concession would amount to extending the life of the wait list and filling a post in a subsequent recruitment on the basis of a previous, concluded recruitment exercise, which is impermissible and prejudices future candidates – It is open for a party to place the correct position of law before the Court and urge that it should not be compelled to give effect to an erroneous concession if compliance would result in the violation of any statutory rules or regulations – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers’ Association Vs. State of Gujarat and others 1994 INSC 199; Paras 12-17] Union of India v. Subit Kumar Das, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1010 : 2025 INSC 1235

 

Reservation – Validity of OBC-NCL/MBC-NCL Certificates – Cut-off Date for Eligibility – Split Verdict – The appeals arose from a split verdict by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court on May 18, 2023, concerning the appointment of Civil Judges under the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010. The Supreme Court heard the appeals before a 3-Judge Bench due to the Division Bench’s split verdict and held that in the absence of a specified cut-off date in recruitment advertisements, the last date for application submission is the default date for assessing eligibility, including the validity of reserved category certificates. OBC-NCL and MBC-NCL 2 certificates are valid for one year, extendable to three years with an affidavit, as per State circulars. Certificates issued beyond this period are invalid for claiming reservation benefits. Subsequent notice clarifying cut-off date, aligning with existing rules and judicial precedents, is not arbitrary. Appellants’ certificates issued between 2012-2018 and after cut-off date were invalid, and no relaxation permissible absent discretionary clause in rules. Appeals dismissed, upholding High Court’s exclusion of appellants from interviews for Civil Judge posts. (Para 36 – 39) Sakshi Arha v. Rajasthan High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2025 INSC 463 : AIR 2025 SC 2232

 

Resignation vs. Voluntary Retirement – Forfeiture of Past Service – Pensionary Benefits – The deceased employee, a conductor with the Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC), resigned in 2014 after nearly 30 years of service citing family circumstances- He later sought to withdraw the resignation and claimed pensionary benefits, arguing that his resignation should be treated as voluntary retirement- Held that as per Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, resignation from service entails forfeiture of past service unless withdrawn in the public interest- Since the resignation was accepted and the request for withdrawal was declined, the past service stands forfeited- Re-classifying a resignation as voluntary retirement would render Rule 26 nugatory and obfuscate the legal distinction between the two concepts- Consequently, the appellant is not entitled to pensionary benefits. [Relied on BSES Yamuna Power Limited v. Ghanshyam Chand Sharma and another (2020) 3 SCC 346; Paras 9-12] Ashok Kumar Dabas v. Delhi Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1186 : 2025 INSC 1404

 

Retired Employees – Recovery of Excess Payment – Principles of Equity – Excess payment made to an employee cannot be recovered if such payment was not on account of any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the employee. Also, excess payment to the employee due to any wrong application of the rule or incorrect calculation on the part of the employer is not recoverable. (Para 9 & 11) Jogeswar Sahoo v. District Judge Cuttack, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 396 : 2025 INSC 449 : AIR 2025 SC 2291

 

Retirement Age Extension – Held, excluding outside State experience to consider retirement age extension is arbitrary – Government’s notification extending the retirement age from 60 to 65 years was made inapplicable to the appellant citing that appellant did not satisfy 10 year continuous teaching condition in University located in West Bengal – Classifying employees based on past teaching experience from universities within or outside West Bengal, particularly at the verge of retirement after decades of service, lacked a discernible object and nexus – Such classification was deemed artificial, discriminatory and arbitrary, violating the equality norm – There was no material to demonstrate how an employee who had served the university for 14 years would be better qualified for extended service only if their past teaching experience was solely in the State of West Bengal – It is a classic case of a suspect classification and artificial classification intended to sub serve only parochial interests and nothing more – Such classifications lacking a legitimate state objective should be struck down – Order of High Court was set aside – Appeals allowed and granted Rs. 50,000/- as costs to appellant. [Paras 19-24, 27] Subha Prasad Nandi Majumdar v. State of West Bengal Service, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 754 : 2025 INSC 910

 

Retirement Age – Prescribing different retirement ages for employees based on the type of disability is arbitrary and violates Article 14. The Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board retired a locomotor-disabled electrician at 58, while visually impaired employees could serve until 60 under a 2013 state policy (OM 29.03.2013). Such distinctions discriminatory, mandating uniform retirement benefits for all benchmark disabilities under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. The impugned decision was set aside, affirming equal treatment across disability categories and the appellant’s legitimate expectation of an extended retirement age until the policy’s withdrawal in 2019. Appeal allowed. (Para 14) Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 646 : 2025 INSC 472

 

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – No distinction can be made between Persons with Disabilities (PwD) and Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) for employment rights. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300

 

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – The court reaffirmed that all benefits granted to Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) must also be extended to Persons with Disabilities (PwD) in examination settings, including facilities such as scribes and compensatory time, without discrimination. The court reviewed the Office Memorandum (OM) dated 10.08.2022, issued in compliance with its earlier judgment in Vikash Kumar, which provided guidelines for PwD candidates with less than 40% disability and writing difficulties. However, the petitioner highlighted several deficiencies in the OM, including its failure to incorporate reasonable accommodation, its restrictive focus on “difficulty in writing,” and the absence of alternative examination modes (e.g., Braille, computers). The court also noted the lack of a grievance redressal mechanism and inconsistencies in implementation across examination bodies. The court directed the respondent authorities to revise the OM within two months, ensuring uniform compliance, extending benefits to all PwD candidates, and incorporating measures such as a grievance redressal portal, periodic sensitization drives, and flexibility in examination modes. The court emphasized the need for strict adherence to the RPwD Act, 2016 and the principles of reasonable accommodation, as outlined in Vikash Kumar and Avni Prakash. The matter was posted for compliance reporting after two months. (Para 19) Gulshan Kumar v. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2025 INSC 142 : AIR 2025 SC 1063 : (2025) 4 SCC 90

 

Rule Against Bias – Audi Alteram Partem – Cure at Revisional Stage – Whether the selection of Shiksha Karmi Grade III teachers in Janpad Panchayat, Gaurihar in the year 1998 was vitiated due to violation of the rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua) ? Whether the cancellation of appointments without affording the appellants an opportunity of hearing (audi alteram partem) violated the principles of natural justice, and whether demonstrating prejudice is necessary to establish such a violation ? Whether the breach of natural justice at the initial stage (Collector’s order) can be cured at the revisional stage (Commissioner’s order) ? The appellants, relatives of members of the selection committee, were selected for the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade III teachers in 1998. Their selection was challenged by an unsuccessful candidate alleging nepotism and bias. The Collector quashed the selection, citing bias and nepotism, without issuing notice to the appellants. The Commissioner and High Court upheld the decision, despite the appellants’ contention that they were denied a fair hearing. Held, the selection was not vitiated by bias. The recusal of committee members with relatives among the candidates, as per the Panchayat’s resolution, eliminated any reasonable likelihood of bias. The statutory definition of “relative” was not fully considered by the lower authorities, and the absence of a hearing prevented the appellants from demonstrating the fairness of the selection process. The Court found a gross violation of the principle of audi alteram partem, as the appellants were not given notice or an opportunity to be heard at the initial stage. The breach of natural justice was fundamental, and the prejudice exception did not apply. The Court emphasized that procedural fairness is inherent and cannot be dispensed with, even if no prejudice is demonstrated. The denial of natural justice at the initial stage could not be cured at the revisional stage. The appellate process cannot rectify a fundamentally flawed initial decision, especially when the revisional authority did not conduct a fresh hearing or address the procedural defects. The selection process was not vitiated by bias, but the cancellation of appointments without a fair hearing violated the principles of natural justice. Given the 25-year tenure of the appellants under interim orders, the Court declined to remand the matter for fresh inquiry, deeming it impractical and unjust. The judgment reaffirms the importance of procedural fairness in administrative decisions, emphasizing that the principles of natural justice, particularly the right to a fair hearing, are fundamental and cannot be overlooked. The Court also clarified that the rule against bias must be assessed contextually, and the doctrine of necessity may apply in cases where recusal is impractical due to small jurisdictions or statutory mandates. Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2025 INSC 126 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1043 : (2025) 7 SCC 545

 

Seniority – If a government employee holding a particular post is transferred on public interest, he carries with him his existing status including seniority to the transferred post. However, if an officer is transferred at his own request, such a transferred employee will have to be accommodated in the transferred post, subject to the claims and status of the other employees at the transferred place, as their interests cannot be varied without there being any public interest in the transfer. Subject to specific provision of the Rules governing the services, such transferees are generally placed at the bottom, below the junior-most employee in the category in the new cadre or department. (Para 19) Secretary to Government Department v. K.C. Devaki, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2025 INSC 389

 

Subordinate Service – Kerala Public Health Engineering Subordinate Service Rules, 1966 (Subordinate Service Rules) and Kerala Public Health Engineering Service Special Rules, 1960 (Special Rules) govern completely separate cadres. Rule 4(b) of the Special Rules applies only after appointment as Assistant Engineer, and cannot be applied for lower promotions. (Para 24) Sajithabhai v. Kerala Water Authority, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : 2025 INSC 354

 

Subordinate Service – Re-evaluation of answer sheets – The Supreme Court directed the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Services Selection Commission (UPSSSC) to re-evaluate answer sheets for the 2021–2022 Revenue Lekhpal examination due to ambiguities in three questions from Booklet Series “B.” For Question 58 (Salt Satyagraha Location), the Court held both (A) Dandi and (C) Sabarmati as correct, noting the march started at Sabarmati but the act of defiance occurred at Dandi, and awarded marks for either choice. For Question 63 (Longest National Highway in UP), options (C) NH2 and (D) None of these were accepted due to outdated designations. For Question 90 (Solar Photovoltaic Irrigation Pump Scheme grant), both (B) 30% and (C) 45% were deemed valid due to policy changes. Criticizing UPSSSC for framing ambiguous questions, the Court ordered re-evaluation for affected candidates without disturbing selected candidates. (Para 10 – 12) Reetesh Kumar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 523

 

The Supreme Court directed the State of Uttarakhand to pay Rs. 89 lakhs, in addition to Rs. 11 lakhs already disbursed, to the family of a deceased doctor killed by assailants in a hospital while on duty. The Court noted that a proposal by the Chief Secretary to pay Rs. 50 lakhs as ex-gratia, approved by the Chief Minister, was not honored, with only Rs. 1 lakh initially paid citing rules. Despite subsequent payments and benefits like family pension, gratuity, and compassionate appointment to the deceased’s son, the Court found the High Court’s compensation calculation using the multiplier method unjustified. Emphasizing the gravity of the incident and nine years of litigation, the Court quantified the total compensation at Rs. 1 crore, including interest, to be paid within six weeks. (Para 5) State of Uttarakhand v. Sarita Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 348

 

Time-Barred Claims – A time-barred service dispute cannot be brought within the limitation period by filing a belated representation. When a government servant is aggrieved by a denial of a benefit, which is not based on a formal order, then a representation must be filed within a reasonable time. The cause of action to approach the Administrative Tribunal arises when an order is passed on such representation or no order is passed after the lapse of six months from the submission of the representation. There may be situations such as denial of promotion or increment, which are not based on formal orders. In such cases, filing of a representation may be necessary, even if the service rules do not provide specifically for such a remedy. (Paras 34 – 36) Chief Executive Officer v. S. Lalitha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 479 : 2025 INSC 565

 

Transfer – Distinction between transfers on request and transfers by absorption in public interest – Determination of seniority of employees absorbed from the Directorate of Health Services (DHS) into the Directorate of Medical Education (DME) following the abolition of the dual control system in medical colleges in Kerala – Held, the transfer of employees from DHS to DME was a result of a policy decision by the Kerala government to abolish the dual control system, and the absorption was not based on the employees’ request but on their option to join DME. The proviso to Rule 27(a) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules (KS&SS Rules), which applies to transfers on request, does not apply to transfers by absorption made in public interest or administrative exigency. The seniority of the absorbed employees should be maintained as per Rule 27(a) and 27(c) of the KS&SS Rules, meaning their seniority would include their past service in DHS. The Division Bench’s judgment was set aside, and the State of Kerala was directed to prepare the seniority list of DME employees, including both original and absorbed employees, in accordance with the Court’s ruling. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the absorbed employees, holding that their seniority should include their past service in DHS, as the transfer was a result of a policy decision and not a request-based transfer. Geetha V.M. v. Rethnasenan K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2025 INSC 33 : AIR 2025 SC 824

 

University – Rajendra Agricultural University Statutes, 1976 – Appeal against High Court order dismissing writ petition seeking inclusion in University’s General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme. Appellant, appointed as Junior Scientist cum Assistant Professor in 1987, did not opt for Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) despite opportunities. University statutes provided for two retiral benefit schemes: CPF (opt-in) and General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cumgratuity (default). University issued Office Order dated 21.02.2008, reiterating this, stating non-exercise of CPF option would result in inclusion in the default scheme. Appellant’s name was omitted from the list of those included in the default scheme. Whether the appellant, who did not opt for CPF, is entitled to be included in the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme. Held, Yes. University statutes and Office Order clearly stipulate that non-exercise of CPF option automatically entitles employees to the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cumgratuity scheme. High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition based on nonexercise of option, as non-exercise led to inclusion in the default scheme. Similar relief granted to similarly placed persons by the High Court. High Court order set aside. University directed to provide retiral benefits under the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme within four months, subject to adjustments of CPF benefits, if any, availed by the appellant. Appeal allowed. (Para 12) Mukesh Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Agricultural University, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2025 INSC 312

 

University – Rajendra Agricultural University Statutes, 1976 – the default retiral scheme applicable to the University’s employees is General Provident Fund-cumpension-cum-gratuity, unless the employee has specifically opted for the Contributory Provident Fund scheme. (Para 9) Mukesh Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Agricultural University, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2025 INSC 312

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